

conditions of society, be taken up by political charlatans (and even by honest men who do not understand the relativity of truth), and converted into fire-brands, which shall destroy the laborious work of ages in a few short years. Extend the rights of the subject or the citizen indefinitely, and society will revert again to its earliest stage. It may be taken for granted that the struggle of the future will be on the part of the State against the encroachments of the individual; and if in the struggle that is coming, the forces of the state are to be marshalled under generals, who are so trammelled by the country's constitutional usages that they are forced to give up the tactics of statesmen and adopt a policy of temporising and expediency, then all hope of ever attaining the dignity of a great nation has forever fled.

These remarks bring us to the second great defect of our existing system; viz. the growing weakness of the Administrative, as opposed to the Legislative portions of our governmental machinery. Every one will be willing to admit that the duties or functions of Administrative and Legislative bodies are widely different, and call for a different class of talent; that a body admirably fitted for the one, would be utterly unfit for the other; and yet, our usages have reduced the Executive arm of our governmental system to such a state of dependency upon the Legislature, that unless something is done to modify it, the latter will by degrees become the sole power in the State.

No Government can be vigorous in its policy, which only holds its trust from year to year; for virtually the failure to carry a majority of the Legislature upon any given scheme, to which an Administration has committed itself, not only defeats the scheme but virtually defeats the Administration. Surely that system which forces a member of Parliament to vote in favor of a measure which has not his conscientious approval, because his vote against it might aid in the defeat of an Administration in whose general course he had full confidence, must be wrong. There need be no fear of the Executive of a country having representative institutions becoming dangerously powerful, the fault will always be in the other direction. Jealously watch your local privileges and the more power you give to the central government, the better you enable it to carry out the expressed convictions of the people. The Executive are in fact a committee of the people, and should be allowed great latitude in the discharge of their administrative duties. In relation to the subject, I cannot do better than quote the words of Alexander Hamilton, one of the principal founders of the United States Constitution: He said, "There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current either in the community or legislature as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purpose for which Government was instituted as of the true means by which public happiness may be promoted. The Republican principle demands that the deliberative sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the management of their affairs; but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze which the people may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests. It is a just observation that the people commonly intend the public good. This often applies to their very errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always reason right."

The fitful gusts of public sentiment often betray a woeful want of wisdom, but the sober second-thought of a free and intelligent people, generally tends to the conservation of morality and truth. It remains for our political thinkers to