

were very far apart, even on the subject of the types of weapons. Proposals were being made at present which were inferior to those agreed to at the SALT II negotiations. In 1982 the USSR had halted deployment of medium range missiles, a move criticized as an attempt to solidify a Soviet advantage, but in 1983 when the United States began deploying Pershing and cruise missiles, the Russians resumed deployment of SS-20 missiles. This participant was not optimistic about progress and noted that both sides were advancing with ASAT (anti-satellite) weapons programs that were mutually threatening. At Geneva, the United States was pressing for a cessation of testing of ASATs by either side. Allegations have been made of violations of past arms control agreements, an important one being the Soviet construction of an early-warning radar system at Krasnoyarsk which was probably contravening or eroding the ABM Treaty. Agreement on verification procedures for both strategic and intermediate range weapons has been impossible.

The agenda for arms control negotiations has become enormous, continued this Congressman, and the subject was a most important issue in Congressional committees. As long as the Administration was serious about the negotiations, there would continue to be bipartisan support in Congress even though there was some disagreement on details and the MX missile vote had been close. There was a sense in Congress, this delegate concluded, that at present the Geneva negotiators have the most important job in the world.

In response to a Canadian inquiry as to whether SDI was already on the Geneva negotiating table, the U.S. Senator indicated the Russians were saying "We'll talk INF when we settle SDI". President Reagan has stated that SDI research was not negotiable. The United States, he continued, wanted INF, START and SDI negotiations to go on simultaneously. In his opinion, the two most serious problems currently were: first, the USSR Krasnoyarsk radar installation which is clearly not a peripheral radar system allowable under the ABM Treaty and had an offensive as well as a defensive connotation. Secondly, the problem of encryption, the encoding of telemetric signals from missile tests. The United States had undertaken not to encrypt missile data but the USSR has a "totally hard" encryption system in place, making verification of its tests extremely difficult. What was needed from the Soviet Union now was a confidence-building measure.

Two U.S. House and Senate delegates described at some length the atmosphere, the personalities and the process at the Geneva negotiations. While in Geneva as Congressional delegates, they had been able to sit in with the U.S. negotiators at the pre-briefing and at the de-briefing sessions. Both sides clearly planned every word they were going to say at the meeting. After the formal negotiating sessions, there was invariably a reception where encounters with the Russians were as important as at the formal sessions. Subsequently the U.S. side analyzed minutely every phrase and reaction of the Russians. Both Kampelman and Tower, the two U.S. negotiators, were judged to be extremely capable.

The U.S. Senator then elaborated on an earlier remark he had made concerning the Russian leadership. Mr. Gorbachev, he said, was a very capable but tricky leader, able to manipulate the western press, an able salesman with the mind of Stalin. "Tough, aggressive and audacious" were adjectives he used in describing him, and he said other prominent Congressional figures held a similar view. Nevertheless, he thought that dealing with this tough Soviet leadership could open the way to arms control. The USSR wanted to buy large U.S. construction equipment, yet their economy was slipping and they had severe agricultural problems as well as increasing military costs. The leadership undoubtedly wanted peace through arms control, he said. All the U.S. negotiators thought it was possible to succeed in the negotiations.

Another Congressman, Chairman of an Intelligence Subcommittee in the House, observed that Gorbachev's first priority was consolidation of his personal power which depended on the appointment of his own personnel in key positions. It would be evident by the January plenary whether or not he had gained full control. His second priority was the economy where he might follow the Andropov line of reform. It would only be possible to judge the effect in a couple of years after the marginal economic reforms, which Gorbachev was most likely to make, would almost inevitably be seen not to be working. At that point he would have to challenge the bureaucracy of the Party itself. In arms control, which was his third priority, he was so far following the Party position which was the result of a collective judgment, and he was moving cautiously. He was not yet in a position to challenge these positions. It was still a collective leadership. But it should be noted that Gorbachev had not replaced a defence figure on the Politbureau. Another U.S. delegate commented that his policy on Afghanistan might give some clues as to what the USSR would do on arms control.

#### *Norad*

This agenda item was discussed only very briefly. The Canadian side referred to the recently concluded bilateral agreement on the modernization of the North Warning System. NORAD itself was coming up for renewal and there was some feeling that it should be a short-term agreement rather than for the long term, a delegate said.

A Canadian delegate mentioned the unsatisfactory situation revealed by an article in the *New York Times* concerning deployment of aircraft with nuclear weapons in Canada. The Canadian military did not appear to have the same information as the U.S. military. There was clearly a lack of effective communication and lines of command.

#### *Functioning of the bilateral defence production sharing arrangement*

This subject was raised in Plenary Committee by a Canadian delegate who referred to the historical basis for bilateral co-operation in defence production and urged a fresh look at how this system could be improved. Canada was increasing its defence spending and would be re-equipping.