

*National Defence Act Amendment*

remembered that Mr. Zuckert was at one time a great exponent of unification. He signed the Symington committee report in this regard but since has changed his mind, he says. I should like to quote Mr. Zuckert's article:

The Air Force Secretary's specific job, as it evolved between 1961 and 1965, embraced the formidable management task of phasing no less than six major strategic weapon systems in or out of operational status—the B-47, B-52, B-58, Titan II, Minute-man I and II, as well as their trained manpower and all their supporting logistic facilities. He had to be mindful at all times of retaining a proper balance of skilled personnel and resources, without slackening total operational effectiveness.

These considerations shaped my decision to stay on the job. They helped to change my views. For a decade or more, I had been an ardent advocate of more unification. But I came to acknowledge, as did Deputy Secretary of Defence Roswell Gilpatric in his farewell press conference in January, 1964, that further unification of the Department of Defence is neither practical nor advisable.

It must be remembered, Mr. Speaker, that the United States proposals did not go half as far as the minister's present proposals. There was no question at all of a single service. To them unification meant the combining of the forces under one chief of staff' one chief of defence, one minister. That is what they were aiming at, and they have not even gone that far. The minister is proposing not only to follow up the organizational changes he has made but he also wants a single service.

I continue with Mr. Zuckert's article:

In any circumstance that I can foresee, unification of the U.S. military establishment has gone about as far as it ought to go. This statement recognizes that some residual areas of service separatism have so far defied reform.

Then he goes on to outline some of these areas which on the face of it suggest that there could be room for improvement. In this regard those of us on this side agree with the government that certain changes could have been made in the administrative and supply echelons of the armed services in 1964. I continue:

Looking at the big picture of service roles and missions, no reason for separate services seems more important than the freedom to apply many years of thinking and experience to operational concepts and weapon requirements.

● (5:10 p.m.)

In the army, navy and air force, and in the marines, too, a sense of professionalism has been distilled to: develop each requirement; design and produce the suitable weapon; devise the doctrine to govern its proper use in battle; then train and supply the troops to operate that weapon effectively in a familiar medium. This collective effort by each service is then funneled to the unified commander in the field for use in his co-ordinated military machine as approved by the joint chiefs.

[Mr. Lambert.]

Then, the last quotation:

From a purely management view, retention of service identity is wholly consistent with the most sophisticated corporate organizations in the United States.

He gives the example of General Motors. This is precisely contrary to the argument which the minister made in his speech the other day that for the setting up of weapons programs, structures, computer analyses and so forth one requires a single service. Mr. Zuckert says quite the contrary. I would think perhaps he has had as much if not more experience than the minister in handling a very great machine. The quotation continues:

General Motors, for example, maintains separate divisions for the production of Chevrolet, Buick, Oldsmobile, etc. They operate within the policy framework of the parent organization, which even encourages healthy competition within reasonable limits to keep everybody on his toes.

A structure embracing a centralized authority at the top and decentralized management responsibility at the service level is very close to being the most responsive to our need.

He continues:

The military services, essentially organized around the medium in which each one operates, offer through the service secretaries precisely that middle level of management which cannot be discharged as well anywhere else in the department of defence.

This article deals with the objections to unification at the ministerial and management level, which is a long way from what the minister proposes. Therefore it shows even greater strength in its logic than what has been advanced by the minister. Then we come to the other NATO countries. What are they doing about following Canada's plan? Nothing.

How does the minister envisage Canada's force operating with allied units which are organized into three environmental services, navy, army and air force, when Canada proposes not to have a navy, an army and an air force? He says he is going to have sailors called privates, airmen called privates and soldiers called privates, all in the same uniform indistinguishable one from the other, all arising from the same amorphous mass.

The minister has attempted to make a case for his reorganization but even the speech which he made last December contains very little in the way of a concrete plan for the complete reorganization of the forces. This is the same problem which arose during the month of October in the debate on interim supply. Although we knew the minister had something in the back of his mind nothing