

Supply—National Defence

knowledge of supersonic flight, metal fatigue and much other scientific information which would have been of great value to us not only in the military field but, later on, in industrial fields as well?

An issue of *Aviation Studies* published by the S.B.A.C. in England, last fall said of the Arrow:

Canada owes it to the free world to put into production the Arrow aircraft, the most advanced interceptor in the western world.

But it was not. The royal aeronautical establishment in Great Britain is the centre of design and development in the aircraft industry in Great Britain. It is similar to N.A.S.A. in the United States. We are told that shortly after the Arrow cancellation in February, when it became known that we had no use for the aircraft we had already built and successfully flown, the royal aeronautical establishment requested that these aircraft be made available to it for testing purposes. We would like the minister to tell us whether there was in fact a request that these planes be made available, and whether in fact the Canadian government offered to make them available to the royal aeronautical establishment.

Mr. Pearkes: Do you want the answer now?

Mr. Hellyer: Yes.

Mr. Pearkes: Yes, they were, and they refused to take them.

Mr. Hellyer: You offered to make them available to the royal aeronautical establishment at no cost?

Mr. Pearkes: I say they were offered to the royal aeronautical association and they declined to accept them.

Mr. Hellyer: What were the terms upon which they were offered?

Mr. Pearkes: You had better ask the Minister of Defence Production that because, as you know, they are turned over to him for disposal.

Mr. Hellyer: We will be pleased to ask him that when his estimates are before this house in a day or two. What was the ultimate disposal? You would think the Minister of National Defence would know. He is a member of the cabinet which would have to make the decision as to what would have been done with those things, and some of us can hardly believe that the ultimate disposal would have been decided upon if it had not been discussed by cabinet.

What happened? First of all, the production line was cut up with acetylene torches to make sure it could not possibly be revived.

Then, after repeated requests of the opposition that No. 6 be completed and test flown to see what its capabilities were, and after being turned down repeatedly we were told that No. 6, too, was cut up with acetylene torches and that a stench like death descended upon the whole Avro aircraft plant. Then, there were the five which were airworthy. We made the suggestion that some useful purpose be found for those; that they be used here in Canada for testing; that they be made available to one of our allies. What happened? Were they? No. They have been cut up, or are in the process of being cut up with the same acetylene torches, and are being cut up for scrap.

This, indeed is a shameful and a sorry thing for a great Canadian project. What a lack of imagination on the part of our government! What a lack of responsibility! First, to kill a great project and then to see that none of the accumulated benefit which was available was salvaged from it. It is little wonder that many thousands of Canadians have, since the date that the Avro Arrow was cancelled, decided that the government acted in haste and without due consideration for the consequences.

Now, we have the sorry thought of the CF-105 being replaced by other interceptors in Canada, either being flown by Canadians or by Americans. We were told at the time of the cancellation that our allies would not buy the Avro Arrow. We suspect the minister went to Washington and said, "You would not like to buy our Avro Arrows, would you?" When we were down there talking to them they laughed at us and said, "Would you expect us to buy a plane which had not been put into squadron service? Would you expect us to make available to our allies in Europe through mutual aid a plane which the Canadian government did not have enough confidence in to go ahead and produce?" There was no answer, no reply which I could give to their inquiry. Just as with the CF-100—we eventually had a market made available to us because it was a successful aircraft and it was available—now we have every confidence that if we had gone ahead with the production of the Avro Arrow we would have been able to sell it to some of our allies.

Mr. Ricard: To whom?

Mr. Hellyer: To one of the NATO countries, in the same way as we made available the CF-100. The hon. member should read his ancient history and get up to date before he starts to make interjections in this house.

Mr. Ricard: Who?