

We shall work vigorously for progress in the Stockholm Conference and the MBFR talks. If these talks bog down, Canada will endeavour to ensure that political leaders again take a personal hand in energizing them. Once the MBFR negotiations resume in March, it will be imperative that NATO respond to the proposal made last summer by the Warsaw Pact.

Following further consultations with our NATO allies, we shall in the course of the current session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology. We will thus give additional substance to the strategy of suffocation which I put forward in 1978. These proposals are:

- a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite systems;
- restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles];
- improvements in the verifiability of future strategic weapons.

In the months leading up to next year's review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we shall continue to press both sides to keep the NPT bargain. For security is indivisible. If countries which do not now have nuclear weapons acquire them, then everyone's security is diminished.

The basis of the NPT bargain was that the nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for the non-nuclear powers not building their own, and that both would co-operate in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, the current nuclear weapons states bear an immense responsibility in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, we must also continue to press our proposal for a conference of the five nuclear weapons states. It is a concept whose logic is compelling. Those five nuclear powers are, at the same time, the permanent members of the Security Council. They have responsibilities as well as vetoes. That is why I asked the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Perez de Cuellar, to explore and to promote confidential meetings of their representatives in New York. In my talks with Premier Zhao in January, I found that the Chinese had, since my visit to Peking, begun to express a readiness to consider such contacts in New York without the pre-conditions they had raised before.

The idea will take hold slowly, to be sure, as new ideas do. But I believe that it will take hold. For example: accident, miscalculation, crisis, systems failure — these are nuclear perils which all of the five powers must cope with. And which they have the responsibility to manage co-operatively. I suggest, therefore, that an early focus of five-power consultations should be crisis management; particularly the handling of nuclear weapons incidents, and the improvement of crisis communications.

Among the five nuclear weapons states, the two superpowers have by far the largest arsenals. They bear a corresponding responsibility to apply the same genius to reducing their arms as they did to building them. They must not let their views of each other's morality and legitimacy prevent an early resumption of arms control talks. It is vital that they resume negotiations on limiting and reducing intermediate range and strategic nuclear weapons.