that, by common consent, is unusable. It argues for more nuclear weapons in order that, in the end, there may be fewer. It perceives the vulnerability of cities and of human beings as an element of stability in the nuclear balance. And worst of all, the debate goes on without much evidence of any light at the end of the tunnel.

When we met in 1978, a dialogue on strategic arms limitations had been going on between the major nuclear powers for several years. A comprehensive nuclear test ban seemed on the verge of conclusion. It never was concluded. Subsequently, another negotiation — SALT II — was concluded. It has not been ratified.

I do not believe it would be productive at this time for the Assembly to try to apportion blame for those failures. I remain convinced that both the major nuclear powers are intent on dissipating the threat of nuclear confrontation.

Positive developments

In this regard there are some positive developments. Negotiations to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) began, as we know, late last year and, following President Reagan's "Eureka" initiative the long-awaited talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms will resume in a few days. All of us have an enormous stake in these negotiations; failure to reach an early satisfactory conclusion could have dramatic consequences. Let me illustrate this assertion.

Since the first Special Session, a new generation of intermediate-range missiles has been deployed by the Soviet Union. Three hundred SS-20s now pose a threat to Western Europe. The alliance to which Canada belongs has decided to counter the Soviet threat by deploying new Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles; and at the same time to engage the U.S.S.R. in negotiations aimed at setting limits on the systems of both sides at the lowest possible level.

It follows that unless the negotiations accomplish their objective by late next year, new weapons of terror will be added to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) arsenal. Having attended the NATO summit meeting last week in Bonn, I can testify that we passionately want these negotiations to succeed in removing the current threat and thereby obviating the need to deploy new missiles of our own. But what will be the position of the Warsaw Pact countries? I must assume that they too will negotiate in good faith. I would add, however, that they would be ill-advised to assume that public demonstrations in the West will weaken our negotiating position.

Massive demonstrations in protest

True, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Western Europe, in Canada, and here in New York last week have taken pains to express the extent to which a renewed arms race is fundamentally repugnant to their values. In many ways, I suppose most of us in this Assembly agree with them. That similar demonstrations have not taken place in Eastern Europe does not, I think, suggest that the people of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact are any more comfortable with the prospect of mutual incineration; rather, it may be due to the fact that they are denied not only