Human rights monitoring and reporting is already one area in which diplomats and development agency field personnel work cooperatively to share information. This should be extended to conflict analysis for early warning. Development agency, UNDP, UN Centre for Human Rights, and UNHCR personnel, in particular, are often based in more remote/rural areas than diplomats, and thus have the advantage of closer proximity to emerging causes of internal conflict. This field proximity should be used to full advantage, while keeping in mind that development/relief workers will perhaps be concerned that this will jeopardise their neutrality. The insight that comes only from sustained contact with local communities in conflict zones is a critical component of effective early warning, and development aid personnel are an excellent source for this. The need then is to produce a systematic, rather than unstructured and ad hoc, approach to early warning analysis by desk and field officers.

The following categories of early warning indicators are proposed as a example of what such a balanced analytical framework could look like.[9] What must be stressed in such an approach is that it is the "overlap" or concurrent interaction of two or more of these categories that creates the conditions for imminent protracted violence - the greater the severity, frequency, and number of categories in combination, the greater the potential for conflict. The presence of only one category of indicators will not, in most cases, herald the onset of *protracted* conflict. What is important for the officer to discern is the *dynamic interaction* of these categories, where present. In particular, the presence of the first (A) category, which focuses on the trigger factor of paralysis in the political process, is almost always associated with an escalation in internal violence and conflict. As well, it must be noted that these indicator categories may be present over the country as a whole (increasing possibility of total state collapse) or confined to certain regions only, where the threat of insurgency is greater. Finally, the reference to specific examples of indicators in each category is meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

*A) Status of Governance / Political Process

This category addresses the medium- and near-term breakdown of legitimate avenues for dialogue and non-violent dispute resolution. Is the government representative of a legitimate and participatory political process? What is the internal political environment like for ethnic and religious minorities? Are there laws which limit or prohibit minority language use, or minority community, religious, or political organisations? Are there constitutional provisions (e.g. official language and/or religion) which clearly put certain identity groups at a disadvantage, which are discriminatory? Are there constitutional provisions or laws which prohibit the access to and representation in governing institutions (e.g. parliament) by minority nationalist parties?

Paralysis and closure of the political process (democratic or non-democratic alike)