assigned exclusively to the provincial legislature, and do not come within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in s. 91 as assigned to the Parliament of Canada: Re Rogers (P.E.I.), 7 E.L.R. 212.

A local or municipal regulation making it an offence to use a heavy motor car on a bridge forming part of a highway of any greater weight than specified in the prescribed notice, except with the consent of the person liable to the repair of the bridge, is *intra vires*; and where such a notice has been affixed to a bridge by the person liable for its repair, any one who drives over the bridge a heavy motor car of a weight exceeding that mentioned in the notice is guilty of the offence: *Lloyd* v. *Ross*, [1913] 2 K.B. 332.

License.—One of the purposes of a license to drive a motor car issued under the Motor Car Act is the identification of the person to whom it is issued, and the production thereof, on due command, to a constable, constitutes primâ facie evidence that the particulars it contains refer to the person producing it, and that he is the person to whom it was issued. Secondary evidence of such particulars may be given although no notice to produce the license at the hearing has been given: Martin v. White, 79 L.J.K.B. 553, [1910] 1 K.B. 665.

The power of municipal corporations as to the granting or refusing motor vehicle licenses may be made exercisable discriminatorily; their acts cannot therefore be controlled by mandamus, particularly where another remedy is provided by statute: Re McKay (B.C.), [1917] 3 W.W.R. 447.

A by-law placing further restriction on the operation of automobiles for hire within the city will not be effective to control an unqualified license already held by the accused which remained unrevoked: Rex v. Aitcheson, 25 Can. Cr. Cas. 36, 9 O.W.N. 65.

Under the Quebec statute (R.S.Q. 1909, arts. 1402-5, as amended by 4 Geo. V. c. 12, s. 3), the chauffeur or operator of an automobile is required, under penalty, to be able to produce his license or certificate of registration, whenever required to do so by the proper authorities; the fact that he does not have it upon his person is no defence: Lebel v. Blier, 51 Que. S.C. 246.

Registration; Identification Mark.—Under the English Motor Car Act, 1903, a right to use a general identification mark is assigned for one year, on the registration of the car; and it is no defence to a charge of using a car on a public highway without being registered that no notice was given to the accused of the expiration of the right: Caldwell v. Hague, 84 L.J.K.B. 543; 24 Cox C.C. 595.

The appellants, motor-cycle manufacturers, had had a general identification mark assigned to them, which was affixed to one of their motor-cycles. One of their employees, without their authority, took the motor-cycle to his home, and left it there for some days, while he was away on a holiday. In his absence, his brother, without the knowledge of the appellants, took out the cycle, and used it with the mark upon it:—Held, that as the motor-cycle was used without the knowledge or authority of the appellants, they had not violated the regulation requiring manufacturers or dealers to keep a record of the distinguishing number, placed on or annexed to the identification of plates, and of the name and address of the person driving the motor car: Phelan & Moore v. Keel, 83 L.J.K.B. 1516, [1914] 3 K.B. 165.