

Kant when we affirm that this presented end is responded to in a peculiar and underived form of feeling, called ethical, whereby everything is (in intent) surrendered to the presented end in corroboration of reason's declaration of its supreme worth.*

This effort to do justice to the principle of reason implied in the empirical theory of the origin of the moral consciousness compels the rejection of the empirical theory and the grounding of moral obligation in the functioning of reason itself accompanied by an underived form of feeling.

(c) Is there an ultimate ground of moral obligation? I mean: shall we, with Leslie Stephen, refuse to go beyond the psychological facts of the moral consciousness, rejecting all metaphysics? Or, shall we, instead, seek to relate the consciousness of moral obligation to the real universe, in other words, to God who is the foundation of all that is? I believe we must seek this ultimate basis of moral obligation. We should observe also that we can show a necessary relation between morality and religion only as we succeed in making it clear that moral obligation is grounded in ultimate Being and that this ultimate Being is at the same time the supreme Object of the religious emotion. If I can show this, the necessary relation between morality and religion will be evident and consequently, worship as the expression of religion, will be a necessary condition of moral attainment. Let us make the attempt.

Note, first, the bearing of the theory of knowledge upon the question at issue. If we are to accept the doctrine that our knowledge is by conceptions and limited to conceptions; if we are to make the test of knowledge consist in the clearness and distinctness of conceptions and the freedom from contradiction among them; if this thought-world so carefully ordered has a defensible claim to represent the world of reality: then must not this clear conception of unconditioned obligation which harmonizes so well with the totality of our rational world, have some definite meaning for reality? In other words, has not the consciousness of moral obligation as much claim to represent a real world and to be grounded in ultimate Being as the conception of causality or substantiality? These are categories of mind but

*Ladd, *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory*, p. 581.