

we reflect upon these appearances, we are furnished with the idea of *succession*;—and that the distance between any two parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is what we call *duration*. Thus, the succession of ideas presents a consciousness from which we derive the perception of a certain lapse of time.

## § 2.

That an actual succession of ideas is requisite to our perception of time, is manifested by the circumstance, that, when that succession ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it. Thus, in profound sleep without dreaming, we have no perception whatever of duration. Having gone to sleep at night, we know, it is true, on waking in the morning, that a certain definite interval has elapsed; but we derive this knowledge by inference from external phenomena, and not from consciousness. We see that the darkness of night has changed to the light of day,—that the sun, which was below the horizon, is above it; and we know by experience that these changes are produced only *in a certain interval of time*; whence we conclude that such an interval must have elapsed since we fell asleep. But if we fall asleep in the evening, and do not awaken until the next day but one, we are unconscious of the lapse of more than one night.

## § 3.

Although a succession of ideas floating at hazard through the mind, or excited casually and without