

know that the day of their own liberation is near."

When the pressures become too strong to bear, the white leaders of South Africa will have to recognize the truth of what has been said by Paton and Woods and Qoboza, just as the white leaders of Rhodesia, however reluctantly, have been forced to accept

similar truths about their country. But suppression of moderate voices such as those of Woods and Qoboza increases the probability that Qoboza's prophecy will come true, that, when the time comes that the whites want to talk, there will be no one left to talk to. The time for talking will over, and the civil war will begin.

## Lebanon, one year after

By André Liebich

More than a year after the Riyadh and Shtaura agreements, which ended the fighting in a large section of Lebanese territory, no clear picture of a new Lebanon seems to have emerged. One is certainly struck by the new face, both contradictory and incongruous, the Lebanese capital presents to the world - the animation of some of the residential and working-class districts stands in contrast to the silent ruins of the downtown area and other areas where fighting occurred. The lively and diversified retail trade is gradually picking up, but operates out of makeshift booths that line the major thoroughfares. Squatters, looking somewhat lost in the luxury apartments where they have taken refuge, rub shoulders with neighbours who - though more comfortably off - are obviously ill at ease. In the shadow of the blackened ruins of the Hôtel Saint-Georges, the Yacht Club offers the vision of a world that is still serene. However, from the political point of view, Lebanon has settled down to a provisional existence, motionlessly awaiting the outcome of events that, for the most part, are largely beyond its control.

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The massive Syrian presence is one of the pervasive facts of daily life in Lebanon. It is impossible to travel more than a few miles and in some sectors of Beirut more than several hundred yards, without running into a check-point of the Arab Deterrent Force. Although officially international - it includes contingents from Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen and the United Arab Emirates - and limited to a maximum of 30,000 men, the Force is overwhelmingly Syrian in composition, and the actual number of troops remains a subject of speculation.

On the political front, Syria's grasp is just as visible. Lebanese politics have a peculiar three-sided nature. In fact, Lebanese leaders of the various factions exchange views through a Syrian intermediary, and Lebanese politics are reduced to pilgrimages to Damascus. Moreover, all the factions involved go along with this mediation - albeit somewhat reluctantly. The few initial opponents have disappeared from the political scene. Karim Joublatt, feudal head of the Druzes and leader of the Lebanese left, was assassinated; "Dean" Raymond Eddé, Christian leader of the "national coalition" and main competitor of Elias Sarkis for the presidency, is in exile in Paris, where he exerts moral influence that is, in any case, declining. The potential adversaries of Syrian occupation are kept under strict surveillance and some of them, such as Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib, commander of the short-lived Lebanese Arab Army, are still under guard in Syria.

All the Lebanese combatants in the civil war now acknowledge the inevitable nature of the Syrian military occupation. Some of them even give it credit for having prevented renewed fighting and for ensuring a minimum degree of internal security.