

erable confusion in the Committee). After his conversation with Engen, Pineau informed Lodge, Dixon, Benelux and other west European representatives, in that order. During the rest of the day all members of the French delegation worked energetically to have our amendments adopted by the Committee.

3. We and the Norwegians met with the USA delegation immediately after Pineau's conversations with Engen and Lodge. We discussed tactics and concluded that the amendments should be submitted in committee, even though we knew some of the African-Asians, like Iran and Ceylon had been advising that the move should be made in plenary. Our decision to proceed in committee was based mainly on the French attitude, but we also had in mind tactical considerations, like the fact that the African-Asian resolution would be put to the vote first and would probably carry with almost a two-thirds majority. It was our view that it might be very difficult to introduce the amendments in plenary either because of a change in the French attitude or because the African-Asians, flushed with success, had hardened their opposition to our texts. We wish to emphasize that these texts were acceptable to many if not the majority of the African-Asians. In particular, they were acceptable to Fawzi, whom Engen kept informed throughout the exercise.

4. Shortly before the Committee adjourned for lunch, Boland introduced the amendments in a brief but masterly intervention. The confusion about the translations kept us from speaking in the morning. The confusion arose because the French text, owing to some overzealous translation, was far more favourable to France than the English original. The Spanish and Russian texts were based on the French one, so there were complaints from all sides.

5. Accordingly, when we intervened after lunch, we placed on record that the co-sponsors stood by the English original. We then spoke briefly in favour of the amendments. The debate went on for the rest of the afternoon and it became clear that the African-Asians intended to oppose the amendments.

6. This resulted from a decision taken by the group in a meeting after lunch. We understand that the representatives of Iran, Ceylon, Thailand and Afghanistan argued strongly in favour of the amendments. Fawzi had previously tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Arab group to take them. The African-Asian decision was that the whole group should oppose the amendments and apparently oppose the draft resolution if the amendments should be adopted. Prior to the vote, however, the African-Asians were quite confident that our amendments would be voted down. Our arithmetic showed that the vote would be extremely close, with one or two votes in doubt on either side.

7. When the vote came, the amendments were adopted as a package by a vote of 37 in favour, 36 against, and 7 abstentions. Of the African-Asians, Laos voted in favour, and Turkey, Liberia, Philippines and Cambodia abstained. Most of the Latins voted for the amendments but Haiti was opposed and Guatemala, Mexico and Bolivia abstained. Yugoslavia, the Soviet Bloc, and the remaining African-Asians voted against the amendments.

8. When the amended resolution was put to a vote, the Liberian switched from an abstention to a vote against, something of a surprise especially because his was the last name on the roll call vote. The draft resolution was rejected because of a tie, 37 to 37, with 6 abstentions. France, of course, did not participate in the voting, and South Africa was absent.

9. There was some confusion in the Committee immediately after the vote. The Tunisian moved that the African-Asian draft resolution be put to the vote in its original form. This, of course, amounted to a motion to reconsider and it would have required a two-thirds majority under the rules. Argentina, however, asked for a ten minute recess for the purpose