

Class expunge a passage from this widely-read book, lest it should upset the agreement that was being made. The book was well calculated to do so, for it calmly stated that the Germans coveted a strip of France from Nancy southwards to Toulon and northwards to the mouth of the Somme. But when, to the infinite wrath of the League, the Agreement of 1911 had been made, the author at once restored the passage to the new edition of his work, and no one dared to molest him. Well might the German negotiator say to the French and English on that occasion, 'We don't want war, but public opinion in Germany is "nervous" and may easily get out of hand.' 'Public opinion' was that of the all-victorious League.

But, long before this Moroccan question, the Kaiser's policy in China in 1897 and 1900, in Turkey from 1898, his attitude to England during the Boer War, his Bagdad Railway business—all these were instances of the triumph of the League's policy over the intentions of a ruler, impulsive and vain indeed, but not naturally either such a fool or such a knave as to wish for an aggressive war. In October, 1908, the poor gentleman, in a moment of ill-judged expansiveness, granted an interview to an English representative of the *Daily Telegraph* and spoke warmly about his affection for England and his desire for peace. The forces of the All-Germanists were so great that in the German Parliament there was actually a debate on the Kaiser himself, as if he were a bill or a policy, and he got a most frightful scolding. The Chancellor of this nominally all-powerful sovereign was obliged to announce 'that in the future, both in his private conversations and in his public speeches, His Majesty would impose upon himself the reserve which is indispensable to the continuity of his policy and