

Supply—National Defence

action, and I do not see any point in jeopardizing security by mentioning the particular section or point in an area where batteries will be placed. All purchases of lands which are required will be made in the ordinary way through the defence construction department.

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Chairman, I have one or two matters to put before the minister, but before I do so I should like to say a word or two by way of comment on the remarks just made by the hon. member for Edmonton West. He spoke very interestingly about the concept of fortress America concerning which I expressed some alarm yesterday and concerning which I still feel some alarm if it should develop in the wrong way. He pointed out that fortress America is essentially a development out of NATO, out of, if you like, the Atlantic fortress idea of 10 years ago which was one of the reasons why we created NATO.

But there is, as I understand it, a fundamental difference between these two things. Fortress western Europe, if I can call it that, was built up for one purpose only, a purely defensive purpose, for the protection of western Europe against an aggressor. Fortress America, which may, if you like, have developed out of the NATO idea, has now become, of course, something else because fortress America is the base from which the retaliatory forces will operate, not all of them but perhaps the major part of them. Fortress America in that sense has become the base for the deterrent.

It is also a fortress in the conventional sense, in the sense I referred to when I mentioned fortress Europe, because it has brought about a tremendous effort to make this continent as secure as possible against an invasion which could only come from the air. It is a problem which is becoming increasingly difficult every year. One of the worries I have about the fortress America concept, apart from the fact that it is perhaps tying us more closely than some of us would like to American defence and strategy, is that these two things sometimes conflict with each other, the fortress America concept in the conventional sense and the fortress America which represents the protection of the deterrent.

In all the hearings that have been held in Washington there is obviously developing a great anxiety as to the division of expenditure and effort on one or the other of these ideas, the development of early warning systems, ballistic missile early warning systems, of anti-missile missiles and the F-108 interceptor to protect the continent, and, the other development involving the deterrent, the

construction of intercontinental missiles and the protection of the bases from which they will be used so that the deterrent, which I think we now admit is our most effective defence, cannot be put out of action. I wonder, and I expressed this worry yesterday, whether even the United States with all its power and strength will be able to proceed with the development of these two ideas. No one can read the testimony at the congressional hearings without being frightened by the magnitude of the dual operation of the maintenance of the deterrent and the protection of the continent at the same time.

There is an interrelationship also not only between these two continental ideas but between the fortress America idea in either of its forms and the defence of western Europe. The stronger the deterrent becomes, the more effective it seems to be in preventing an all out assault. And the greater the feeling that it is our major protection and will be used as such, the less incentive there is in Europe to devote as much energy and as much of their resources as is necessary for the protection of western Europe itself by conventional means of defence. So you have, you have an example of it right now, almost a vicious circle. If it is not vicious it certainly is a circle. The stronger the deterrent becomes the less incentive there is for the European members of NATO to develop the kind of conventional defence methods which are required so that we will not have to use the deterrent in a limited war.

Mr. Lambert: In that connection may I pose a simple question? Would you wish to halt all technological development?

Mr. Pearson: I certainly would not.

Mr. Lambert: I think that would be the only way to stop it.

Mr. Pearson: As I tried to point out yesterday, you have to maintain the deterrent in its most effective form. Whether you can do that and at the same time spend so much of your resources on continental defence is something for the governments to decide. I would not halt the development of the deterrent technologically, but I cannot see any point in adding to the deterrent beyond the strength which is necessary to accomplish its purpose. If in fact 50 hydrogen bombs can destroy a continent, there is not much point in adding 10, 15 or 20 in the future.

The point I am trying to make is that it should be possible, in fact it is essential, for the members of NATO to have the feeling that they can defend themselves in western Europe against what might be a limited attack not meant to result in a world war. It is surely essential that the NATO countries in