

## STATEMENTS AND SPEECHES



INFORMATION DIVISION  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
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N O R A D

- 1 - Extract from a statement by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on tabling the Exchange of Notes concerning NORAD, in the House of Commons, May 19, 1958.
- 2 - Texts of Notes exchanged by the two Governments.

Members of the House will recall that on August 1, 1957, the two Governments announced their agreement to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States. An integrated headquarters was formed shortly thereafter and the Command has been operating on an interim basis for about nine months. In the light of intensive studies of the problems of continental air defence by expert authorities in the two countries, and the experience gained in the interim operation of NORAD, the Canadian and United States Governments have in this exchange of notes recorded formally their understanding of the need for integration of their air defence activities and their agreement on the principles, both military and political, on which the organization and operation of NORAD are based.

For the past two decades the co-operation of Canada and the United States in the field of continental defence has grown ever more intimate. Even prior to the formation of NORAD, there was close co-operation between the air defence forces of Canada and the United States arising out of the recognition that the air defence of the two countries had to be thought of as a single problem. Indeed, since 1954 an integrated system of air defence has been envisaged. Recent technological developments made it obvious to the two Governments that co-ordination of national plans was no longer adequate. It is a truism that our generation has witnessed a shrinking of the globe in our ever-increased ability to reduce the time required to go by air from continent to continent. Normally, we think of these developments as being most desirable. We must not, however, forget their implications for the defences which we must construct against the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack. We