

If we break some of the above into point form, donors and the Russian Federation might consider working together for long-term sustained disposition by drafting a Multilateral Agreement and related accords which:

- create new agency for nuclear safety and environmental protection in Russia through the use of a nonprofit multinational management corporation (MMC) along lines initially suggested for discussion by the U.S. Department of Energy;
- design the MMC to allow transfer to the Russian Federation of all operations other than finance upon the achievement of agreed benchmarks;
- see to it that the MMC is firmly guided by a set of public policy objectives, but is otherwise relatively autonomous in managing the nuts and bolts of disposition;
- state the Corporation's terms of reference to include a mission of enculturation through the transfer and entrenchment of best practices, especially in nuclear safety and environmental protection;
- transfer the successful experience of the intergovernmental Arctic Council by including one Russian and one U.S. nuclear-watchdog or environmental NGO as permanent non-voting participants in the MMC's Intergovernmental Council and advisory committees;
- allow for similar NGO participation on international nuclear-safety and environmental-impact assessment panels convened by the MMC, and therefore with Russian Federation assent, to evaluate the disposition programme as a whole;
- enhance, either through unilateral Russian action or jointly, the authority, budget, and enforcement powers of GAN and a new Ministry of the Environment which the Federation would undertake to establish;
- make clear that a regional referendum, possibly with international monitoring, would be held in Russia if necessary; and
- act vigorously to decouple disposition from Russian plans to import spent fuel.

This is some of what it could take to protect Russians and their environment against hazards peculiar to disposition, and disposition against hazards peculiar to Russia.

4. Findings and Recommendations

Proactive conditionality can do plenty for disposition. In its drive for sustainability it makes for joint action that's more likely to succeed in the long haul than when the parties' initial concerns concentrate on negotiability, technical robustness, and cost-effectiveness. In the particular case of disposition in Russian conditions, the potential for misadventure and the need to ensure against it demand unusual efforts to anticipate and address contingency. A proactive conditionality assists in moving the parties to question and when necessary to traverse normal assumptions, standard procedures, and even theologies. It opens the way to new departures when they are needed. Beyond this, conditionality is a tool for the design of collective measures, in this instance international support for Russian disposition. It has guidance value in helping us to recognize patterns amidst complexity, to formulate a strategic choice, to select an optimal