

## NOTES

1. Oppenheimer's and Viner's views were published in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 90, no. 1 (January 1946), pp. 7 and 57.
2. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I* (Washington: US Government, 1977), p. 29.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
4. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume V, Part 1* (Washington: US Government, 1983), p. 512.
5. Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoenig, *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), p. 15.
6. McGeorge Bundy, et al., "Back from the Brink", *Atlantic*, August 1986, p. 36.
7. Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence", *World Politics*, vol. XI, no. 2 (January 1959), p. 175.
8. André Fontaine, "What Weapons against War?", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 3 July 1983, p. 12.
9. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 66.
10. Henry Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 12.
11. "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (Excerpts), 11 April 1983", *Survival*, July/August, 1983, p. 177.
12. Kissinger, *Necessity for Choice*, p. 13; and his edited volume, *Problems of National Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 4.
13. This question is discussed more fully in my *Nuclear Fallacies: How We Have Been Misguided Since Hiroshima* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), pp. 71-75.
14. Brodie, "Anatomy of Deterrence", p. 175.
15. Hanson W. Baldwin, *The Price of Power* (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 328.
16. These issues are examined more fully in an excellent article by a former officer in the Royal Navy, Michael McGwire, "Deterrence: the problem—not the solution", *International Affairs* (London), vol. 62, no. 1 (Winter 1985/86), p. 55-70.
17. McGeorge Bundy, "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences", in Douglas MacLean, ed., *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), pp. 7-8.
18. For evidence concerning the pre-emptive first strike strategies of the two superpowers, see Daniel Ford, *The Button: The Pentagon's Strategic Command and Control System* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1985), especially pp. 105-108 and 233-242; and Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Perspectives on the Paths to Nuclear War", in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War* (New York: Norton, 1985), especially pp. 178-182 and 200.
19. See especially Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea", *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 3 (Winter 1985/86), p. 23.
20. Thomas Powers, "Spontaneous Combustion", *The Sciences*, September/October 1985, p. 52.
21. *Defense Electronics*, August 1983, p. 19 (emphasis added).
22. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Defence of the West* (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 86. "The study of war has taught me", he wrote in a later work, "that almost every war was avoidable, and that the outbreak was most often produced by peace-desiring statesmen losing their heads, or their patience, and putting their opponent in a position where he could not draw back without serious loss of 'face'." (B.H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defence: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position* [London: Stevens, 1960], p. 254.)
23. Ole R. Holsti, *Crisis, Escalation, War* (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 119.
24. The major authority on these crucial questions is Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983).
25. Vice Admiral John M. Lee, in a letter to the editor, *New York Review of Books*, 5 December 1985, p. 69.
26. *Ibid.* Other military officers have been similarly critical of this nuclearized policy: see for example Field Marshal Lord Carver, *A Policy for Peace* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), especially chap. 4; and Admiral Noel Gayler, "A Commander-in-Chief's Perspective on Nuclear Weapons", in Gwyn Prins, ed., *The Choice: Nuclear Weapons Versus Security* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1984), p. 15-28.
27. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume I* (1977), p. 39.
28. Stanley Hoffmann, "Realism and Its Discontents", *Atlantic*, November 1985, p. 136 (first emphasis added).

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