

supports the outline set forth for START II, and we hope it will lead the superpowers to further reductions and limitations in pursuit of these objectives...

At this year's session of the UNDC, naval disarmament was again considered. Substantive and open-ended consultations were conducted under the chairmanship of the representative of Indonesia and resulted in a chairman's paper that summarized the views and proposals of countries that participated in the discussion.

This paper, although it contains widely-divergent opinions, deals with a number of ideas, some of which may be pursued or elaborated in future multilateral consideration of naval arms control and disarmament. Ideas discussed included proposals on the regulation of nuclear-powered ships, including notification of accidents and safety guidelines for seaborne nuclear reactors, and an elaboration of earlier proposals on multilateralizing incidents-at-sea agreements. Canada supported consideration of naval disarmament issues in this forum, and we regard this dialogue as a useful and relevant one.

As I now turn back to an area where Canada believes are the best prospects for progress, at least in the short term, I am reminded of a well-known Canadian

journalist who, on the margins of the Open Skies Conference, compared Canadian arms controllers to Dale Carnegie instructors because of their fixation with confidence-building. This same Canadian journalist went on to say: "For the uninitiated observer, confidence-building seems to be like a mantra for the arms control experts, a phrase which, if chanted often enough, takes on magical, though undefined, properties."

Undefined though those properties may be, in my view they add up to a process, the sum of which is indeed greater than its parts — because of the mutually-reinforcing action of the process of confidence-building with the overall state of political relations.

That is why Canada has actively promoted discussion within NATO on confidence-building in the maritime environment. Preliminary consideration of naval security and arms control has been undertaken both in Brussels and in Ottawa. I believe that, despite the difficulties, we must continue to pursue such studies.

Canada favours, in principle, consideration of measures that would promote mutual trust through transparency, enhance personal contact, and build upon the seafaring traditions of fairness and courtesy. The recently-signed Canada-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea is a good example of this approach on a bilateral basis. The Agreement includes a procedure enabling the timely passage of information concerning incidents that may occur at sea. It outlines a list of signals,

agreed upon in advance, which permit ships of one country to inform those of the other of their activities and intentions. This could avoid the possibility of ships incorrectly concluding that they are witnessing aggressive acts directed against them.

An important aspect of this Agreement is the human one. Annually, Canadian and Soviet naval staffs will meet to discuss the Agreement and other subjects of mutual interest. The signature of this agreement is therefore a step Canada has taken to promote stability and mutual confidence at sea.

Our military exchange agreement with the Soviet Union, which envisages expanded military contact, also includes reciprocal naval visits. Under this agreement, four Canadian vessels recently conducted an unprecedented visit to the port of Vladivostok...

Given that confidence-building measures are intended to address the psychological or subjective aspects of the perception of "threat," as well as its more objective aspects, the importance of promoting such contacts between our militaries cannot be overemphasized. In the Vienna CSBM context, for example, the value of the seminar on security concepts and military doctrines was as important for the fact that it allowed the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the 35 CSCE participants all to meet together face-to-face as it was for the content of the discussions.

In conclusion, in judging the prospects for naval arms control, it is important to bear in mind that we are at the early stages. Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe have been ongoing, in one form or another, for the past seventeen years, and are only now beginning to bear fruit. Negotiations on strategic arms have a twenty-one year history. Given the complexities of the maritime environment, it is unrealistic to expect rapid movement or dramatic action in this area, especially as so much attention is being placed on the large-scale reductions of conventional forces envisaged for Europe under CFE I and its follow-on. What is required now is a careful, imaginative assessment of the possibilities in the maritime area. ■



Canadian and Soviet officers on board a Soviet vessel during the Canadian visit to Vladivostok (see page 13). Rear-Admiral Cairns is in the front row, third from the right.