



towards genuine arms control. The set of CSBMs which was tabled on January 24 has been compiled with these considerations in mind.

Canada realizes we have set ourselves ambitious goals and we do not underestimate the inherent difficulties in achieving them.

Conflicting interests exist in an international climate marked by mistrust and ideological confrontation. We shall need concrete and verifiable CSBMs if we are to overcome this mistrust and to reduce tensions.

In these circumstances exhortations for trust and confidence in the abstract sound hollow and unreal; the problem of security must be attacked on a more concrete basis. How to find some accommodation so that States perceive themselves as less threatened and more secure? The CSBMs to be agreed at this Conference will therefore have to involve verification of credible evidence that military activities by any State do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any State or States.

The establishment of a verification mechanism as part of a mandatory CSBM regime is necessary if confidence is to take root and flourish. Confidence can only be based on specific moves that can be verified and evaluated and indeed predicted.

As in the case of all negotiated security arrangements, the establishment of a viable verification process, as part of a mandatory CSBM regime, is essential if the security of the participating States is to be enhanced in a real way. The verification mechanism which we adopt must help us to decide, as a political judgement, whether or not military activities are in conformity with the agreed CSBMs or whether by exceeding agreed parameters they have other purposes and objectives.

Some governments in the past have misinterpreted the idea of verification as a gathering of intelligence which would eventually be used to their military

disadvantage. These arguments do not really stand up under close analysis. Indeed, such an interpretation invalidates the basic premise of CSBMs, but I expect that it will be advanced during the course of the discussions to come. And because it does invalidate the basis for CSBMs, it must be faced early on. The essential difference between intelligence gathering and verification is the form and purpose of the respective activities. On the one hand, intelligence is covert, generally unilateral and frequently merely quantitative. On the other hand, to be effective, verification would have to be overt, multilateral and cooperative, operating in accordance with agreed rules. Verification differs from intelligence in the emphasis it places on intentions, something which raw intelligence gathering is not normally able to provide.

Adequate means of verification have to be implicit in each CSBM. In other words, the CSBMs must be clear in terms of parameters and purpose so that in a crisis situation there would be no doubt whether the CSBM had been implemented or not.

Verification provides a mechanism for clarifying misunderstanding. It is really at the heart of the confidence- and security-building process. To perform this function, verification must involve continuous collection and analysis of data, it must command the authority for, and control the means of, clarification, and it must be capable of carrying out a credible inspection.

Let me comment briefly on these three requirements. First, the continuous collection and analysis of data. This function is vital to the whole process. It consists of gathering and analyzing data dealing with activities defined by CSBMs and on a continuous basis, by a combination of whatever sources of information are agreed upon as being appropriate. In the context of CSBMs, analysis should show whether a violation had occurred or not, so that a decision could be taken whether and how to take the matter up with a violator. The results of such analysis could require additional information, or trigger off an inspection.

A request for clarification would be intended to provide an opportunity for rapidly answering genuine concerns which could arise from misunderstanding, factual errors or abnormalities in relation to the provisions of a CSBM agreement. An inspection might or might not be required in the process of verification, but should such a requirement exist it would be essential to avoid delays which may have significant consequences for the security of States.

Inspection would involve the right to conduct, on demand, at any time, and without delay, within a specified period of time and by agreed means, an unobstructed survey of forces and military activities in order to confirm or deny suspected non-compliance with the terms of an agreed CSBM. Modalities for inspection would establish a process that in itself would form a real deterrent to non-compliance. Therefore, refusal of inspection, or an inadequate response to it, would be recognized as an act of political significance in itself.

Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention today to discuss in detail the CSBM verification mechanisms that could flow from our negotiations here, but I did wish to share with other Delegations some general thoughts on these problems, and by so doing to suggest the magnitude of the task before us.

Verification means could clearly take several forms.

But if they are to enhance security and stability in Europe and increase the extent to which intentions become more transparent, the verification techniques discussed here will have to cut new ground.

I fully recognize that the goals we have set ourselves are very ambitious, and that the inherent difficulties that will face us as we endeavour to pursue these goals will likely mean that we will have to progress step by step. But let progress be deliberate and purposeful. Because the task is urgent. And because so many hopes and expectations are focused on our endeavours."