

be able to give its consideration to the Control Machinery for Germany in the occupation period. He anticipated these questions would have to be dealt with before long by the Commission, and they would obviously have a very important bearing on the whole question of effective participation by the European Allies.

Then, too, Sir William thought there might be certain United Nations organisations of a functional character in Germany. For instance, there might be a United Nations Commission on the Restitution of Property taken from German-occupied countries. From what Sir William said it was clear that the United Kingdom authorities were giving earnest consideration to the necessity for European Allies sharing the responsibility for dealing with the problems of Germany after the war, but that they anticipated considerable resistance from the Russians over this question.

I then mentioned to Sir William the special position of France. Sir William said that while France could, of course, not at present be considered technically as one of the United Nations, it was to be hoped and anticipated that by the time the Instrument of Surrender was signed she could be included in that category. In any event, it was certainly the United Kingdom intention that the French should be consulted with the other European Allies about the Instrument of Surrender, and should give their assent to it.

So far as Post-Hostilities plans in Germany were concerned, it was still an open question whether or not France should be treated on an equality with the three Great Powers, and whether, for example, the High Commission for Germany should not be a four-nation body rather than tripartite. I asked Sir William whether he could tell me anything about the attitude of the Russian representative on the European Advisory Commission to the problem of France. Sir William said that speaking very confidentially he could tell me that the Soviet representative did not show any particular sympathy for the French. Mr. Gusev was inclined to take the line that it was questionable whether the French would be strong enough to be a great Power after the war, and it was also doubtful whether they could be fully trusted, as there were substantial elements in France which had collaborated with the Germans. Sir William said that he thought there were two views held in Moscow on the French question. There was a pro-French trend of opinion which was represented in the articles of Ilya Ehrenburg, and there was also a much more sceptical view to which Mr. Gusev seemed to adhere.

I told Sir William of the proposal of the Canadian Government to take up with the United States and Soviet Government the main difficulties which we saw in the Draft Instrument of Surrender as it at present stood, and which I had already outlined to him. He said that speaking personally he could see no objection to this course, and that it might prove helpful.

On my thanking him for his full account of the present state of discussions regarding the Draft Instrument of Surrender, Sir William said that he hoped that I would call upon him at any time if he could be of any assistance.

3rd July, 1944.

C.S.A.R.