From an article by Herr Winand Engel in the Pan-German organ, *Das Grössere Deutschland*:—

" German policy is forced to secure for itself by all conceivable means domination over the world-sea. I deliberately use the expression ' domination over the world-sea ' and not the expression ' freedom of the seas,' which is common to-day. The latter expression is either dishonest or stupid. The sea is free to us only if we dominate it. If we do not dominate it, it may one day be closed against us."

These statements breathe the same spirit as Bonaparte's fiery utterances. The " Freedom of the Seas " is explained to mean something which would enable Germany to obtain certain strategic advantages and improve her position as a maritime Power. But the nature of these strategic advantages—the naval bases demanded; the use to which they would be put (" jumping-off places " for the navy)—reveal very clearly the ulterior object of the claim. The German object in claiming the " Freedom of the Seas " does not differ from Bonaparte's—to destroy England's command of the sea, and to obtain the command as the essential factor of world-dominion. This is the military aspect of the question; the commercial aspect, as it is derived from history. is dealt with in outline in this essay. For Bonaparte it was another means of achieving the same object, and the doctrines he advanced have been advanced by the Germans. It may be summarised in one short sentence—to utilise the neutral.

The aim of the neutral was to trade with the enemy with greater freedom from England's belligerent interference. The aim of the enemy was to trade with the neutral with the same freedom, because that trade would assure his supplies of ships' timber and naval stores, without which he could not carry on the war.

This was as true of the war carried on by Louis XVI as it was of the Napoleonic Wars. Bonaparte's principle was that as against England no nation had a right to be neutral; and the " Continental System " was built up by the use he made of unwilling