

Agreement on these points would narrow the differences separating the two sides to one major question: What is to be done if there is a dispute as to the nature of an event which has taken place in the territory of one of the parties to the agreement? It appears from new scientific data submitted last August at Geneva by the United States and Great Britain that the area of uncertainty where doubtful events could arise has been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, controversy persists over the question of how to verify that no underground testing takes place. Technical problems which have been raised in the examination of this subject could not usefully be discussed in this committee. However, there is a fundamental matter of principle which my delegation is firmly convinced must be borne in mind by the nuclear powers in their negotiations in this field.

It is agreed, I think, that no foreseeable inspection system will fully meet the pre-occupations of all parties to a test ban agreement. What is needed then is a reasonable assurance that their interests will be protected. But this criterion cannot be applied exclusively to the risks which may be inherent in the treaty itself; it is equally important not to lose sight of the grave risks which humanity continues to run in the absence of such an agreement.

It has been alleged, for example, that a verification system involving on site inspection could mean that espionage data would be collected by the inspectors. In my opinion, the possibility that the international inspectorate could be used in this way is exceedingly remote. I cannot believe that the Soviet union would seriously contend that this risk compares in any way with the dangers which they themselves agree are inherent in continued testing.

It is also argued that the risk of a state evading its obligations under a nuclear tests agreement must be reduced to a minimum. My delegation fully recognizes the importance of this requirement, since a treaty which would not give assurances that states were living up to their commitments would be cause for continuing concern and tension rather than diminishing these factors as an

effective agreement is intended to do. But the risk of evasion should also be balanced against the dangers mankind must live with in the absence of an agreement. If it is feared that states might sign an agreement and later conduct secret tests, the nuclear powers must not only ask themselves whether this risk is acceptable in principle. They must also assess with equal care whether the military significance of such evasions would be greater or less than the dangers to health and security resulting from continued testing and an accelerated arms race.

This balance of risks and advantages has to be kept in mind in order that the negotiating parties may assess the real significance of possible espionage or evasions. As long as the negotiators concentrate their attention on the disadvantages to their security which might result from a particular system of inspection, it is doubtful whether any real progress is possible. But when these disadvantages are seen in their proper perspective, against the graver prospects of continued testing, the necessary conditions will exist to bring an effective test ban to reality. If the negotiating parties can readjust their thinking in this way, new compromises, acceptable to both sides, could be achieved without delay.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me review briefly the main considerations which will guide my delegation in dealing with the questions to be decided under the present item:

First, we wish to see a halt—by January 1, 1963 or earlier—to all nuclear weapons tests;

Second, as a means of achieving this end, we support the proposal for an immediate test ban in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater;

Third, we desire an effective international agreement which will provide assurances that no further tests are carried out and that all states live up to their obligations under the treaty. We are convinced that these objectives demand urgent attention, and we sincerely hope that this committee will act quickly and forcefully to assist in their realization. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Canadian delegation will give its full support and active co-operation in this endeavour.