

reconstructing large areas of the world destroyed by war, have tested the abilities and the resources of many peoples. The test questions are obvious ones. When the emergency came, had they resources in men or material to put in the common pool? Did they adjust their national life to meet the emergency, conserving or expending their resources and directing their energies according to some intelligible plan? If they were invaded, did their integrity as nations withstand the shock of defeat and occupation and did they contribute to their own liberation? Did they set about the tasks of reconstruction, either on their own behalf or, if they remained intact, on behalf of others, making their resources available with the same sense of mutual dependence as in wartime? These questions, of course, are significant only insofar as they indicate what will happen if there is a new emergency, and we should perhaps rephrase them in slightly different form. In keeping the peace, which are the states that have the resources and the political ability to accept this kind of responsibility? If we fail to keep the peace, which are the states that, whether they like it or not, will have these contributions exacted from them? I do not propose to make a list. An article on this subject by a Canadian professor in the June, 1947, issue of International Organization suggested the following middle powers: in Europe - Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland; in the Americas - Argentina, Brazil, Canada and Mexico; in the Pacific - Australia, India. This is his list, not mine. You may wish to add to it or subtract from it in the discussion.

When we have made our list, we come back to the question, does it really make any difference - or is it merely a matter of national self esteem? Perhaps the best answer I can give to this question is to take an example from the experience of one country, Canada, in relation to the peace settlements. Canada participated in the war continuously from September 1939 to its conclusion in 1945. It mobilized over a million men in a population of twelve million, its forces participated in the fighting on many fronts. It financed its own effort and loaned many millions of dollars under the Canadian equivalent of lease-lend (Mutual Aid) to other allies. It expanded its industrial capacity so that it became one of the most important arsenals of the war, and it was an indispensable source of food. In the immediate post-war period it made available further millions of dollars in the form of credit for post-war recovery in devastated countries. As a result it seemed to the Canadian public that Canada should be given a part in the plans for peacemaking commensurate with the part she had played in the war. This was not simply in order to satisfy national honour. It was because, if the peace were a bad one, we should suffer from the consequences, and suffer in proportion to our size and resources. Canada, therefore, has been dissatisfied with the arrangements by which peacemaking has been kept within the control of the Big Powers. In regard to the treaties with the satellite powers, it was not until the texts had been drafted and agreed in private by the Council of Foreign Ministers that the other belligerents were permitted to comment on these texts, and at that stage their comments were largely ineffective. As far as Germany is concerned, similar procedures were suggested by which effective control of the draft treaties would remain in the hands of the major powers. No one, of course, large or small, has been able to make much progress towards a general German settlement, but the problem of associating in the settlement the effective secondary allies will remain to be solved when the process of peacemaking is renewed.

The problems which confronted the middle powers in regard to the work of international organization which was commenced towards the conclusion of the war were similar in character. For the middle powers, the possibilities offered in the development of collective security were of tremendous importance. In a predatory world, the middle powers are more vulnerable than their smaller neighbours, and