"The debate between "neorealists" and "neoliberals" has been based on a shared commitment to "rationalism." Like all social theories, rational choice directs us to ask some questions and not others, treating the identities and interests of agents as exogenously given and focusing on how the behaviour of agents generates outcomes. As such, rationalism offers a fundamentally behavioral conception of both process and institutions: they change behaviour but not identities and interests. In addition to this way of framing research problems, neorealists and neoliberals share generally similar assumptions about agents: states are the dominant actors in the system, and they define security in "self-interested" terms. Neorealists and neoliberals may disagree about the extent to which states are motivated by relative versus absolute gains, but both groups take the self-interested state as the starting point for theory." (pp. 391-392)

22.   Wendt distinguishes between "weak" liberals (those who accept the realist view of institutions' inability to change interests) and "strong" liberals (those who sense that institutions can somehow transform interests and identity). The latter, because they are still bound to the liberal institutionalist perspective, lack a theoretical account of *how* this type of change can occur. *Ibid.*, pp. 392-393.

23.   Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," pp. 41-42.

24.   Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power,* p. 10, quoted in Keohane and Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," p. 46. This is an example of the "strong" liberal impulse to "bring in sociology" noted by Wendt.

25.   Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," pp. 71-72.

26.   Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change In International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," *International Organization,* Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 222-223.

27.   Thomas Risse-Kappen's views provide a sympathetic, approximately parallel but "less radical" take on the importance of ideas in changing institutions. See "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization,* Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring 1994).

28.   It might be more accurate to characterize this as a "proto-regime" because it is not clear whether the transformation initiated several years ago in CSCE Europe will evolve into a full security regime or collapse into a "neither fish nor fowl" condition, lacking stark divisions between hostile camps but exhibiting little broad cooperative security behaviour. Patterns are difficult to discern due to four possibly idiosyncratic complicating factors: (1) the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia; (2) the often conflicting efforts of the European Union to create its own broad security environment; (3) the uncertain role of the United States in CSCE/OSCE-European affairs; and (4) the complex, overlapping, and competitive development of NATO. These all undercut the momentum towards a true CSCE security regime.

29.   The argument has been made that the regime approach does not work very well in the realm of security relations. The key element underlying this observation is the fundamentally uncooperative nature of security relations in the typically anarchic international system. In the absence of cooperation, it does not make much sense to talk about a formal regime. However, not all security endeavours entail non-cooperative assumptions. The best example of a security-related regime is to be found in Roger K. Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Regime and International Relations," *International Organization* Vol. 41, No. 2 (Spring 1987). This article provides a useful general discussion of the role of regime theory.
    Because confidence building entails cooperative principles and shifts in basic perception about the operation of international relations within the security realm, it may also be a good candidate for the application of regime theory. It is the position of this review that it is.

30.   Note that confidence building seen through the realist lens does *not* simply devolve into the minimalist understanding of confidence building. The minimalist understanding revolves around enhanced information