

Nuclear Forces (INF), between the United States and the Soviet Union, contained extensive provisions for exchange of information and on-site inspections, and after this a similar acceptance of co-operative measures of a hitherto unacceptably intrusive nature was experienced in START.

Thus, the acceptability of intrusive on-site inspections was motivated primarily by the needs of verification rather than confidence-building, and by the bilateral needs for arms control of nuclear weapons. However, the multilateral CFE adopted intrusive on-site inspections for verification, as did the global CWC. The multilateral CSCE adopted them for confidence-building. It seems probable that intrusive activities such as on-site inspections will be key provisions of future confidence-building measures that may be agreed among other countries, whether multilateral or bilateral, regional or global.

While the BTWC of 1972 did not provide for any kind of verification infrastructure, subsequent arrangements have been made for confidence-building measures, including exchange of data on research centres and laboratories, declaration of vaccine production facilities, information regarding unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases, and other related information. States parties are encouraged to pass domestic legislation to criminalize the development, production, acquisition and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, and to undertake not to contribute to the proliferation of such weapons. Even more than for chemical weapons, a difficulty in verifying compliance and building confidence in regard to programs involving dangerous biological and toxin materials is caused by the very close similarity between the materials and technology needed for a wide variety of peaceful applications and those needed for the manufacture of weapons.

Even though a proposal made at the 1991 BTWC review conference for the establishment of an implementation or oversight committee for CBMs was not adopted, many of the efforts to

monitor and to encourage compliance with the convention are taking the form of confidence-building measures. With the severe difficulties facing effective verification of the supply side of biological and toxin weapons proliferation, a major hope for restraint rests with the curtailment of demand through confidence-building. At the same time, the review conference established an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. That study was concluded in September 1993, and will likely lead to a Conference of States Parties to review the results and decide on any further actions.

The Open Skies Treaty, signed in 1992 by 25 NATO and former Warsaw Pact states, is primarily an agreement for confidence-building. All of the territory of the member countries is open for overflight, which includes the United States, Canada and eastern Russia, and is therefore much more extensive than the European territory open for inspection under the CFE Treaty, or for the application of the CBMs of the CSCE. Moreover, aerial inspection for verification of CFE awaits completion of the validation phase of the CFE Treaty. The aerial inspection for both CFE and CSCE is restricted to the area of the declared site being inspected.

Confidence-Building Measures in Bilateral Agreements

Most of the ground-breaking initiatives in arms control, verification, and the parts played by confidence-building measures, were made in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the latter stages of the Cold War. While these will never be repeated, they hold lessons that could be of value when new approaches are being attempted, on either a bilateral or a multilateral basis, in the coming decade.

Even during the Cold War, when distrust between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its deepest level, their mutual desire to avoid a nuclear war led to proposals such as

