

was certainly progress in developing external information programs during this period, particularly towards the end, but the pace was very slow in terms of resources and the degree of conviction within the Department that this line of work was really relevant and valuable for the effective conduct of foreign relations.

It would be idle to suggest that the Department mounted anything better than a mediocre and lacklustre information program during these years and some suggestions are made to account for this. However, some important psychological considerations were part of the story. In a rather long study of the Department's press and information services in 1966, the present author commented:

It is not too difficult to identify a number of particular and detailed flaws in the Department's external information performance and to envisage a repair or patching job to improve these. But the malaise of the body of information work as a whole cannot be explained by symptomatic description of malfunction of the parts. On the contrary, a healthy and confident operational body would long since have found remedies for particular defects. In the more than twenty years since World War II which have witnessed the vast growth of Canadian participation in international life, the information function has not developed correspondingly and the Information Division in Ottawa has continued to be, under successive Governments and successive departmental managements, a tolerated but unloved stepchild. The information job has been and still is widely regarded in the foreign service as at a second level and somewhat irrelevant. The Glassco Report states accurately: "Career foreign service officers regard service in the division, if not as a penance, at least as an