

for example, is now to be considered "parallel" to the CSCE, in effect making force reductions in Central Europe once again a precondition for agreements on security and cooperation. Also it is urged that the duration of the CSCE be dependent upon the maintenance of a certain degree of unity within NATO, thereby allowing any one government the option to hold the entire negotiation up. More important, however, the "Atlanticists" have been trying to spike the Conference by proposing impossible agenda items and generally trying to overload the negotiations. They favour the insertion of exchanges of information and people into the agenda in order to focus the attention of the Conference on issues where "basic and irreconcilable differences exist," and to develop subversive activities against the socialist countries.⁴⁷ For similar reasons there is also an interest in this quarter in discussing "guarantees of sovereignty" for Eastern Europe at the CSCE. These and other proposals represent unacceptable demands on the Soviet Union and its partners to reject proletarian internationalism and the class approach to peaceful coexistence.⁴⁸ They also reveal an interest in "the disruption of the socialist community and a restoration of capitalism in the European socialist countries."⁴⁹

A second trend in Western policy as it relates to the CSCE concerns East-West economic relations. The Genoa precedent suggests that in going to the CSCE "as merchants," the