

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

production facilities. It would be useful if the secretariat were to compile all relevant statements, with the assistance of delegations making them. We also call upon the Soviet Union, and any others who acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide more detailed information, as the United States has already done.

Our objective is to rid the world of chemical weapons. This can only happen if all of the States possessing chemical weapons become parties to a future convention. Obviously, this will not happen automatically. The members of the CD need to consider carefully how to promote the widest possible adherence to the convention. It is not too soon to address the question of how to obtain participation in the convention by as many as possible of the 15 or so States that are currently believed to possess a chemical weapons capability. Similarly, States need to consider the risk posed by States which possess chemical weapons remaining outside the convention. What can be done to minimize this risk? These are, of course, hard questions, but they must be faced.

I would now like to address a number of specific negotiating issues relating to the CW Convention.

One useful result of the intersessional negotiations was agreement that article III of the rolling text should include a provision to declare any "facility or establishment" for the development of chemical weapons. However, the discussion showed that the scope of the key phrase "facility or establishment" was very unclear. Thus, a footnote in the rolling text states that more work is necessary. To assist in resolving this matter the United States proposes that the phrase in question refer to facilities or establishments that "specialize" in chemical weapons development. This would provide a practical approach that covers the locations of direct concern. It would avoid covering facilities that may have only an indirect or one-time involvement, such as a wind-tunnel that might on occasion have been used for aerodynamic tests.

Much has already been achieved in Cluster I in developing procedures for the declaration of chemical weapons and for monitoring the declared stocks prior to destruction.

One important step was made when the Soviet delegation announced on 17 February that it could agree to destruction of all chemical weapons and would no longer insist on a right to divert some chemicals to peaceful purposes. This was a constructive step. It was, however, curious to hear the Soviet accusation on 5 March that the United States had then blocked agreement in this area by changing its previous position. At the bottom of this tempest-in-a-teapot was the United States view that such common and innocuous commercial chemicals as sulphur and isopropyl alcohol that were stored for chemical weapons purposes need not be destroyed and might be diverted for civilian use. Apparently the Soviet delegation had failed to notice that the United States adopted this view more than a year ago, in early 1986, as a move toward the Soviet position. To be castigated now for moving to the Soviet position calls into question the seriousness of the Soviet accusation. None the less, since our attempted concession has apparently become an obstacle in the negotiations, we will resolve the problem by returning to our original