tilt towards "bringing South Apridad thomaske of This To be effective, a sanctions strategy must specify its objectives. It is commonly claimed that the primary objective of a sanctions strategy is fundamental change -- the dismantling of apartheid. Anglin argued that the objective is justice, which is not necessary synonymous with peace, growth or development. A number of approaches were put forward as means of attaining this objective. One approach, epitomized by the "constructive engagement" policy and appeasement of the Reagan administration, is conversion; that is, white South Africans should be "re-educated" to enable them to appreciate their "true interests" and the "error of their ways." The second approach seeks to topple the "regime" through protracted armed struggle, which would undoubtedly entail economic dislocation and probably external intervention. This, in Anglin's estimation, seems the most likely of scenarios. The final approach put forward was dialogue--meaningful negotiation towards a strategy for final change. This approach must specify who wields power in Southern Africa. In principle, all parties support dialogue; however, in practice, it is much more difficult since Pretoria maintains that the "pillars of apartheid" are non-negotiable. In light of white South African intransigence, it is "inconceivable" that this strategy could succeed without the application of force on the white community from outside (e.g. sanctions) and from inside (e.g. the Black struggle). The pre-eminent question thus becomes; to what extent can sanctions induce parties to come to the bargaining table?

Two views of the role of sanctions in promoting dialogue were presented. The first identifies sanctions as a "peaceful alternative to armed struggle." The second identifies sanctions as a compliment to armed struggle. Although the current Mulroney policy is intended to "bring South Africa to