

tified the major outstanding issues (outer space, new technologies, nuclear disarmament, naval arms race, conventional disarmament, the verification study, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, disarmament and development, and non-proliferation) and wondered whether, in four hours, existing differences could be bridged. By 2:30 a.m., however, despite considerable progress, major differences remained and the Chairman was obliged to finally admit defeat and call a halt. The Chairman's group had not had time to overcome its differences on the "Assessment" and "Disarmament Machinery" sections of the draft paper and still failed to agree on several substantive elements of the section dealing with "Future Development and Trends."

The final Plenary session concluded at 7:30 a.m., June 26 with exhausted delegates expressing their disappointment. The concluding statements of several countries, however, reflected a desire to focus on positive aspects of the Special Session and avoid recrimination. In his final statement, the President of UNSSOD III acknowledged that points of disagreement had been reduced and areas of agreement broadened.

Assessment

Canada shared the broad sense of disappointment in the wake of almost a month of concentrated effort. One could, nevertheless, derive some comfort from a number of developments. Despite the existence of major differences of approach, a much more positive atmosphere prevailed at UNSSOD III than had been the case at UNSSOD II. Furthermore, there was increasing recognition among the Non-Aligned of their responsibility in the ACD process, particularly in relation to conventional arms, and a general avoidance of unhelpful ideological rhetoric.

In view of these encouraging trends, why did the Special Session end in failure?

There are several reasons. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is that the fundamental differences of approach to ACD noted above remained so entrenched as to preclude a meaningful consensus on key ACD issues, despite

the improved atmosphere. Such differences have long been apparent in UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee voting and within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In addition, there seemed to be little sense of purpose or urgency at UNSSOD III. Despite the active presence of many articulate NGO representatives, there was little discernible public pressure, as reflected by the lack of media interest. Even when the clock was evidently running out, many delegations preferred to reiterate national positions rather than focus on overcoming substantive differences. Despite last-minute efforts, the strength of purpose required to forge consensus simply failed to materialize.

The Canadian Delegation at the Special Session was active throughout. The Government's extensive pre-UNSSOD III preparations facilitated the submission of substantive Canadian position papers, subsequently published as official conference documents, on the three major agenda items.

In addition, Canada played a particularly active role in the COW, its three working groups and during the informal consultations with the COW Chairman. Canada was a leading member of the small group which negotiated language on the verification study, having earlier submitted a joint paper on the subject with the Netherlands. Canada also submitted papers recommending a "UN orientation programme for NGOs in the field of Disarmament," on the subject of "UN information and educational activities" and, jointly with Australia and New Zealand, on the "Advancement of women in the disarmament process."

Looking ahead, a major objective for Canada will be to seek broader support for pragmatic and realistic approaches to ACD, building upon the UNSSOD III experience. Of more immediate concern will be to ensure that such approaches become a predominant feature of the deliberations of the First Committee which Canada expects to chair at UNGA 43. A major Canadian objective will be to translate the progress achieved on verification at UNSSOD III into a concrete UNGA resolution calling for UN experts study on the subject. □

Carleton Verification Symposium

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) of Carleton University hosted its Fifth Annual International Symposium on Arms Control Verification March 23-26, 1988 in Ottawa. In cooperation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs, NPSIA has sponsored a unique series of symposiums, each of which has focussed on a different aspect of the verification process. Last year, in conjunction with the School of Journalism at Carleton University, NPSIA successfully hosted a symposium which considered the role of the media in verification.

This year, Professor Brian Mandell undertook a retrospective examination of the 1973 Sinai war in an attempt to apply that experience in developing a verification model. Using his recently published study *The Sinai Experience: Lessons on Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management* as a guide, some 30 academics and arms control specialists from within government and from independent institutes undertook the identification of elements following the war which might be applied in a setting designed to prevent a future war.

The keynote address by Ambassador James Goodby, now with the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, set the stage. He described the problems likely to be encountered in the proposed conventional arms reduction talks, the mandate for which is currently under discussion in Vienna. Academics, researchers and other experts from Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Holland and the United States presented papers identifying significant issue areas to be addressed. This Canadian-sponsored symposium is one of the first to focus almost exclusively on the way ahead in term of future multilateral negotiations on conventional arms reductions in Europe, which are likely to commence in late 1988 or early 1989. The results of the symposium and its predecessors are available from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at a price of \$6.00 per issue. □