

very long on the other clauses of the resolution. Without such a settlement, which we might have pushed forward under the incentive of fear, our resolution, as I see it, may not make for an enduring and real peace. We need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace.

I believe that there is another omission from this resolution, to which attention has also already been directed. The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to withdraw or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines, where presumably, if this is done, they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations Armistice Commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate.

I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution—and this has been mentioned by previous speakers—authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with Member Governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea, which was mentioned also by the representative of the United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the resolution has been completed, it may not be too late to give consideration to this matter. My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.

We have a duty here. We also have—or, should I say, we had—an opportunity. Our resolution may deal with one aspect of our duty—an urgent, a terribly urgent, aspect. But, as I see it, it does nothing to seize that opportunity which, if it had been seized, might have brought some real peace and a decent existence, or hope for such, to the people of that part of the world. There was no time on this occasion for us to seize this opportunity in this resolution. My delegation therefore felt, because of the inadequacy of the resolution in this respect, that we had no alternative in the circumstances but to abstain in the voting.

I hope that our inability to deal with these essential matters at this time will very soon be removed and that we can come to grips with the basic core of this problem.

Speaking shortly after the Canadian delegate, Mr. J. F. Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, said:

I know that the resolution was far from perfect and far from satisfactory to all of us, including, perhaps, myself. I felt that it was a situation where the importance of acting promptly was very great.

In my opening remarks, I spoke of the importance of a constructive and positive development of the situation, and not merely attempts to turn the clock back. Mr. Pearson, the representative of Canada, also spoke rather fully upon that point, and I want to emphasize my complete agreement with what he said, and not only my personal agreement, but the feeling of President Eisenhower, with whom I talked a few hours ago about this aspect of the matter. It is a phase of the situation which we deem of the utmost importance, and the United States Delegation would be very happy indeed if the Canadian Delegation would formulate and introduce as part of these proceedings a concrete suggestion along the lines that Mr. Pearson outlined.

In the subsequent discussions and developments three main themes may be distinguished: further "cease-fire and withdrawal" resolutions along the line of the United States proposal of November 1; attempts by the Soviet Union to organize alternative types of action; and definition and implementation of the Canadian proposal for an emergency force.

Although the first occupied a good deal of time it may be recounted briefly. At the meeting of the Assembly on November 3 a draft resolution was submitted by 19 countries. This re-affirmed the United States resolution which it noted had not been fully complied with, authorized the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for implementation of a cease-fire and report on compliance