

we conclude, that God justly requires some satisfaction on our part. It is evident that God forgave Adam and Eve the guilt of their disobedience, but they smarted under the punishment of that disobedience; all the evils which we endure, or which will afflict their guilty descendants to the end of time, are strong and irrefragable demonstrations, that although the guilt of their apostasy was pardoned, its punishment was not remitted. So, too, it happened with Moses and Aaron. God had forgiven those just souls the faults which they had committed at the *waters of contradiction*; but he afterwards punished them for it, for he declared, that they should never enter the land of promise, but only view it at an envying distance. (vide Dent. ch. xxiii.) The same punishment he inflicted on the more guilty of the Israelites, although he told Moses, that he had forgiven them, according to his request. (vide Numb. ch. xiv.) Such also was the case with David; for when the royal penitent acknowledged his crime to the prophet, 'The Lord has taken away thy sin,' replied the inspired seer, 'but because thou hast caused the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme on account of this word, the son, who is born to thee, shall die.' (2 Kings, ch. xii.)

It ought then to be admitted as a principle, that God generally expects some satisfaction for sin, even after the guilt is removed or forgiven. For this reason the church deems satisfaction a part of the sacrament of penance; and hence it is the confessor's duty to impose some satisfaction on the penitent, proportionate, in some respect, to the confessed crimes. This atones wholly or in part for the punishment due, and generally consists of one or more of these good works, recorded in the book of Tobias; "*Bona est oratio cum jejuniis et elemosynis.*" *Prayer is good, with alms deeds and fasting.* (Tob. xii.) It is just, and even advantageous to us, that in pardoning sin, with the eternal chastisement due to it, God shall require some temporal punishment, to retain us within the sphere of our duty; lest being disengaged too speedily from the demands of justice, we abandon ourselves to false confidence and presumption, and prevent his facility in pardoning to our own destruction.

Since to every sin, a degree of temporal punishment is generally attached, after the guilt is pardoned, the church in former days subjected public sinners to public penance during a period of time, more or less protracted, according to their guilt. The bishops, however, then exercised the privilege of abridging the time, or mitigating the severity of the punishment, as the fervour and circumstances of the penitent might require. They claimed the same in private penances. And this abridgement or mitigation was termed an indulgence, and was a real remission of temporal punishment due to sin. It is not, as our adversaries have said, a license to

sin, but always presupposes that true repentance has taken away the guilt of sin, or if not, an indulgence is of no avail. To this power of indulgence may be referred the power of changing one penitential work for another, more useful, or pious, or charitable, which the church claims. In regard to indulgences, little is defined by the church. Private divines assert and maintain their opinions on the subject, but the Catholic is not bound to believe any thing more, than that 'the power of indulgences was left by Christ in his church, and that their use is very salutary to the faithful.' (Symb. Pii. iv. et Conc. Trid.) We read in 2 Cor. ii. of St. Paul conferring an indulgence on the repentant Corinthian. The church deems herself now in possession of the same spiritual power, which St. Paul exercised then; for she believes, that it is as necessary now, as it was in the Apostle's age, and consequently, that the providence of God has not left his church destitute of it. Catholics acknowledge that this power has been sometimes abused; but this cannot militate against its existence. St. Peter writes, that some people *abused and perverted the scripture*, to their own perdition, but this can be no reason why we should reject its authenticity or doubt of its veracity.

Should the repenting sinner die, before he has fulfilled the satisfaction due to his sins, we believe that, though just, he cannot enter heaven, for he is in some sense as yet defiled with sin, and "nothing defiled can enter heaven." (Apoc. xxi.) Catholics believe, that he remains in the state of punishment, until this be accomplished, and this state they term Purgatory. They believe that those only enter that state, who die without having fully expiated those crimes, of which they have repented, or who die guilty of small transgressions, which they denominate venial sins. The doctrine of Purgatory is most consonant to religion and reason. Suppose that a person, who whole life had been spent in the performance of virtuous deeds, and had never been stained by a fault, were, the moment before he expired, to commit the smallest of all possible faults, but still a real offence against God, and die before he repented of it. The supposition is very possible, and therefore can be adopted as a basis of legitimate argumentation. Can the merciful Creator of mankind sentence that man to eternal torments? Would it be just? That judge would certainly act unjustly, who should sentence a man to *capital* punishment for the *least* of legal offences. Human justice is an emanation from that divine perfection, which exists in God, and if this act would be unjust, surely God cannot condemn a man for the smallest offence to undergo the greatest of punishments. And yet, as nothing defiled can enter heaven, so this man cannot. What must become of him? He must unquestionably be somewhere, and this place, our adversaries may call it what they please,) we can