

as such, contributors with the United States to Canadian security.

Thus the source of the economic threat to Canadian sovereignty is its principal military ally and partner in North American defence, while the potential ally in the Arctic, the Soviet Union, is its principal military adversary; and the decided economic counterweight, The Nine, Canada's military allies, who are demanding a greater military contribution from Europe in return for the "contractual" Canada's room for manoeuvre is restricted to the extent that the success of its attempts to forge a contractual economic link with Europe depends on its upgrading its alliance contribution to Europe, which in turn diverts its military resources from other tasks closer to home. In effect, Canada has had to abandon its declaratory defence policy because of developments in foreign economic policy, something that clearly has important long-term effects on its domestic security.

Canada can be seen as the soner of its size, its richness in resources, the fact that its neighbours to the north and to the south are the superpowers, its small population and, finally, the weakness of its military establishment.

TO first

date, Canada has not been faced with making a choice of where to place emphasis in its defence policy; the North Atlantic Alliance has traditionally been first. What was significant about the 1964 White Paper was that its nationalism was in marked contrast to its internationalism, particularly during the Pearson years. Now, however, the tasks that must be fulfilled by the armed forces, together with the relative meagreness of the numbers involved, make a choice necessary. What is available is not to be spread so thinly as to constitute merely a symbolic presence both at home and in NATO. A choice may soon be made as to whether the danger to natural resources and the threat to sovereignty posed by the United States Government and some of the multinational companies, as well as the dangers posed by an increasing Soviet maritime capability, do not outweigh the benefits of the economic link with Europe with its present military underpinnings.

This is not to deny that a link to the sea may, in fact, be necessary, but it does raise the question of whether the military component of the link is appropriate for Canada in view of the concern over sovereignty in the North and the capabilities required to enforce the soon-to-be-introduced 200-mile economic zone. When the

principal military ally is perceived as the threat in the domestic environment, and the principal military adversary in the external environment is perceived as an effective counterweight in the question of sovereignty, the principal actors and the various interweaving factors form an intricate calculus that exerts different pulls and makes reconciliation very difficult.

It will be recalled that it was a scant eight years ago that the Prime Minister remarked that Canadian defence policy with respect to NATO had largely determined Canadian foreign policy — the tail wagging the dog, it was said. There should be little doubt in his mind now which comes first and, for that matter, has always come first. It now seems that foreign policy has determined the exact nature and posture of Canadian defence policy with little regard for the implications of this fact on the domestic security environment. The purchase of *Leopard* tanks and a replacement for the CF-104 are expensive bargaining chips, the more so when the benefits of the contractual link are as yet unknown, at least on this side of the fog of official rhetoric that has characterized the diplomatic offensive from the beginning.

That Canada must remain in NATO is by now quite clear. It is equally clear that its contribution to NATO must be greater than the token forces deployed since 1969. One means of at least partly resolving the multifaceted conflict in defence policy, however, is for Canada to reallocate its military effort within NATO in such a way that the task of protecting its sovereignty and the obligation to NATO may, as far as possible, coincide. It is argued here that there must be an alternative to the present plans to qualitatively improve Canadian forces under SACEUR, that there must be a way to reconcile the conflicting demands of domestic security with the need for an economic and political counterweight (thus the NATO commitment in its present form) within Canadian defence policy.

A suitable vehicle for bringing this about is the idea put forward by Professor Nils Orvik for an Arctic Command within NATO. Such a command would consist of Canada, the United States, Britain, Denmark and Norway. It would give some institutional recognition to the increased capabilities of the Soviet Navy, especially the Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula, with the political and military dangers that this poses for the North Atlantic states. It might stimulate a greater interest by these nations in matters relating to northern security than

*NATO
contribution
must be greater
than token force*