

25.

DEA/50141-40

*Le chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly,
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 2056

New York, November 29, 1958

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIIMMEDIATE.

Repeat London, Washington (Information).

By Bag Athens, Ankara from London.

CYPRUS

After several consultations with key delegations the Norwegians and ourselves yesterday produced a piece of paper which attempted to describe in a way palatable to the principal three the largest area of agreement which we thought could be found in the Assembly for a resolution to close the Cyprus debate. We met together late yesterday afternoon with the UK Permanent Representative to get his reactions to our line of approach. We pointed out that obviously our form of words was not repeat not a draft resolution but that we were showing the paper to him to see to what extent his delegation might find acceptable a resolution based on those ideas. We explained that they were being put to him informally in response to the UK suggestion that the Norwegians and ourselves might be helpful on the Cyprus item. We reiterated that we were not repeat not directly involved and, as my Norwegian colleague put it, it is happily not repeat not necessary for us to have a Cyprus policy. However, we remain willing to associate ourselves with a compromise which would command at least the acquiescence if not repeat not the support of the three principal parties. Thus, the Norwegian-Canadian paper could not repeat not be considered as an "initiative" and we would not repeat not proceed if we met objections from any of the three.

2. Dixon took exception to the main line of the paper, feeling that it placed unacceptable emphasis on agreement on a final solution and he suggested increased emphasis on a recognition of the Macmillan plan as the interim arrangement in operation for the "cooling off" period.²²

3. Dixon indicated to us that he anticipated that it would prove impossible to get Greek agreement to any formula which would be acceptable to the UK and the Turks. He thought that the intransigence of the Greek position had been increased by the activity of the Indian delegation in propounding draft resolutions which went further to meet the Greek position. In the circumstances he indicated that it might be preferable for the UK to proceed with their own resolution amended to make it more generally acceptable rather than to try for a solution based on acceptability to all three of the principal parties. The Norwegian Ambassador pointed out that this would of course be a decision for the UK to make, having in mind their estimate of the voting support which the UK resolution might obtain.

4. Dixon explained that the reactions he had voiced were personal and that he would seek London's views on our ideas. We reminded him of the status of our paper and said that it did not repeat not bear the judgment of either the Norwegian or the Canadian governments

²² Voir la 7^e partie, chapitre 2.

See Chapter 2, Part 7.