

is not in the nature of Naval Officers to show anything but the highest regard for Ministers of the Crown. So do not allow yourself to be made to believe this is a trivial matter.

Had a proper and complete study of unification been conducted, it would have been obvious that the basic premise, and only justification, for a single force, on which the proponents for full unification could hang their argument was that the armed forces had only *one* role. I think there grew up an idea that the policing role *was* the only role, and if that was the case why not have a single force, a highly mobile force which could go anywhere quickly to deal with policing situations? This idea was expanded with the argument, that if the police force was properly equipped with modern weapons it would, in fact be a mobile army capable of dealing with policing situations and able also to meet army commitments in an emergency. Along with this there grew up the idea that because of inter-continental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons war was unthinkable. War of all sorts is unthinkable, and always has been, but it hasn't prevented us becoming involved in war, nor can a defence of Canada be based on a gamble that we cannot become involved in war.

Those of you who heard my classified briefing on 23rd June must have been startled by the serious situation which had developed at sea. You could not have failed to conclude that there is a distinct and separate role for the navy—and a highly specialized and professional one that is, distinct and separate from the **mobile force and police force** concept. You could not help but conclude that this role is a continuing one, and that it is so vastly different and far removed from the predictable tasks for the Mobile Force that to lump all three services into a single force makes no military sense whatsoever. I am not alone in this viewpoint. The Chiefs of Staff in Britain, in the United States, in all of NATO to my certain knowledge share my concern over the situation at sea, and have no doubts whatsoever as to the distinctly separate role of navies in respect of it. This being so, there can be no merit in causing a complete upheaval of the navy to remould it into a single force, a single force having two completely separate reasons for its existence.

The Minister, in his early utterances on unification, assumed there was a high degree of interchangeability of personnel. There is almost no economic and practicable interchangeability possible between the navy and the other two services. It was argued, for example, that the artillery officer of the army was interchangeable with the weapons officer of a ship. Nothing could be further from reality. To attempt to achieve, within a single service, a high degree of interchangeability, would be a very expensive and futile venture. So the premise that unification will lead to economy is false.

It has been argued that recruiting for a single service eliminates competition between the services to obtain the prospective recruit and is therefore more economical. There may be some merit in this argument but there are other arguments which are more important in sustaining the personnel strength of the armed forces. The weakness of this theory has been demonstrated amply, already, for the armed forces are not getting anything like enough recruits to meet their tasks. When I went on retirement leave the current forecast was that the armed forces would rundown until they were 18000 officers and men below strength. The effect on the navy will be that in June of next year only about 14