

At the Washington Summit on 1 June 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev issued a joint statement outlining the text of a prospective START treaty and reaffirming "their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year."¹⁰ As expected, the outline stipulated that each side would be restricted to no more than 6,000 deployed warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (submarine-launched ballistic missiles and launchers, land-based ballistic missiles and launchers, and heavy bombers). No more than 4,900 of the warhead total could be deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs and no more than 1,540 on heavy ICBMs. The May agreement on cruise missiles was incorporated in the outline, and mobile missile warheads were limited to 1,100, though verification of their missiles was left unresolved. The treaty would have a duration of fifteen years unless superseded before that time by a subsequent agreement.

The counting rules for ALCMs and for heavy bombers not equipped to carry them but able to carry gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles, as well as the failure to include in the prospective agreement either non-deployed (reserve) missiles launched from silos, submarines and bombers or SLCMs, meant that the reduction in strategic warheads of the two signatories would be on the order of thirty to thirty-five percent, rather than the fifty percent agreed to in principle by Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev at their November 1985 summit in Geneva. The June 1990 summit also failed to resolve the issues of the Backfire bomber and heavy ICBM modernization, or a new one concerning the "non-circumvention" clause. The US wanted to make sure that the latter would not interfere with its traditional assistance to the British strategic nuclear programme.¹¹

Finally, Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev signed a statement of goals for a follow-on START II accord in which they would "seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs."¹²

CURRENT CANADIAN POSITION

Reduction of the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals remains one of the Canadian Government's main arms control priorities. Speaking in Moscow in November 1989 Prime Minister Mulroney stated:

A pre-requisite to genuine peace is the reduction of conventional and short-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the correction of imbalances in these forces, as well as the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides to minimum levels consistent with basic security requirements.¹³

¹⁰ "Text of the Agreement on Long-Range Arms." *New York Times*, 2 June 1990, p. A8.

¹¹ Michael R. Gordon, "Talks Fail to End Disputes on Long-Range Arms." *New York Times*, 2 June 1990, p. A4.

¹² "Bush-Gorbachev Summit: Agreeing to Agree." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 13 no. 24 (16 June 1990), p. 1200.

¹³ Office of the Prime Minister, *Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney Prime Minister of Canada, Moscow, 20 November 1989.*