

commitments to Berlin, and implied none by stating that "American commitments are to the Western Allies, not the West Berliners." (16-8-61). The Halifax Chronicle Herald did not make a distinction between commitments to the rest of the alliance and West Berlin, but it called for a permanent division of Germany because then the Berlin problem would not be as acute (27-7-61). After the Halifax speech editorial opinion expressed the desire for the crisis to be handled by the U.N. (16-8-61).

However, the majority of the press seems to have accepted the Government's position of remaining firm, but willing to negotiate on other issues. La Presse expressed alarm over the possibility of nuclear war arising from the crisis, and wanted pressure exerted on both sides to reduce tensions (27-7-61). The Toronto Globe and Mail felt the NATO role of organizing to meet the threat was correct, but the West should be willing to negotiate (8-8-61, 10-8-61). In most cases the press saw Canada being involved, but that Canada had very little say in the final outcome or the solution to the crisis. In this respect the problem of France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure posed a parallel problem for the press.

The question of French's withdrawal not only posed a threat to the concept of collective self-defence, but also had domestic overtones for Canada. Consequently, the Government was placed in a most difficult situation since it supported the prevailing NATO strategy (rejected by General de Gaulle) realizing that this could have adverse affects on Franco-Canadian relations. Therefore, while supporting a closely integrated NATO, the Government sought the retention of a French presence within the alliance (See Appendix No. 1). The majority of the press agreed with this approach to the crisis, and 63% (12/19) of the papers in table No. 11 supported Government policy. Furthermore, table No. 9 shows that more editorial opinion was closely aligned to the Government's solution than on any other issue - 47% (9/19) of the papers have the same score as the Government.

Only the Ottawa Citizen was willing to go further than the Government in an effort to meet the demands of General de Gaulle and to keep France within NATO. (Elements of the French Canadian press were also quite sympathetic with de Gaulle's position, but they did not show the same degree of support for NATO). The Citizen realized a "considerable degree of compromise" would be needed if Europe's role in NATO was to be increased, and on this point "the course of wisdom is to try to meet French objections more than half-way." (22-2-66). One of the reasons for this proposal was the Citizen's belief that "a shift in power is inevitable", and ways must be found to keep NATO operating as an effective organization (2-3-66), if only "in truncated form." (11-3-66). Bi-lateral agreements (rejected by the alliance) were one answer since France must "play a full part in European defence". Otherwise, de Gaulle would be isolated and tempted to engage in "unpalatable diplomatic adventures" in Eastern Europe. Blame for France's withdrawal lies with the entire alliance (12-4-66) and "it is inconceivable that political progress toward a political settlement in Central Europe could be made without French participation. To isolate France would be to retard settlement, and the political stability it would bring." (25-5-66).

At the other extreme was the Halifax Chronicle Herald and the Montreal Star since neither paper offered support for NATO. In an editorial