

guinary logic, well and good. And his philosophy? He simply had none. He scourged the brutal elements in the characters of both sexes like a confessor of the Middle Ages.

Victuri Salutamus.

Behold the young men, Canada,
In thy arena throng,
They turn to thee their dawn-lit eyes,—
How brave they are and strong!

They bear no blades with lethal power:
The swishing scythe they swing,
The rustling, fragrant hay in mounds
With tangled spears they fling.

With hew and hack among the pines
Their battle-axes sound,
Till dark Goliath topples o'er
Crash-crashing to the ground.

The plough's bright javelin they thrust
Through brown sweet-smelling earth,
War arrows make their harrow-points,
And bent bows have no worth.

The stealthy daggers they have crossed,
Vine-clusters thus to clip;
Their tridents search the streams, their nets
No more with man's blood drip.

Hear them salute thee, Canada,
The air is rent with cheers;
No slaughterers of men are these,
But true-heart pioneers!

WILLIAM P. MCKENZIE.

The Socialism of To-day.—II.

BY HAMPDEN BURNHAM, M.A.

In "Man vs. the State," Mr. Spencer sums up his ideas of socialism and individualism as follows: "As I heard," he says, "remarked by a distinguished professor, whose studies give ample means of judging, 'When once you begin to interfere with the order of Nature there is no knowing where the result will end.' And if [Mr. Spencer continues] this is true of that subhuman order of Nature to which he referred still more is it true of that order of Nature existing in the social arrangements produced by aggregated human beings." In this connection it would seem as if we might reasonably ask why the extraneous power of interfering with nature was conferred upon man unless there be some higher than a natural reason.

The Greek state was founded upon the supposed presence of the chivalry of self-sacrifice in every breast. Each one who had attained the dignity of citizenship was expected to die for the good of all when occasion offered whether as a matter of fact he wished to do so or not. Thus apparently there was more of altruism in the people of ancient Greece than in the people of the present day. Though, without doubt, the ideal life is that of self-sacrifice, yet it is only so where self is sacrificed voluntarily by self. To compel the sacrifice of self by means of political systems is to rule with a despotism little less than that of the king of Dahomey.

Law has been called the declaration of custom. As such it must be co-existent with custom, ceasing when the custom dies out. It will be observed how different this is from the moral law which is not local but universal. A sense of duty, for example, is universal. No where is it thought right to wilfully deceive though it may be considered permissible. To say that the idea of duty is the idea that if we do not do in a large way what we find expedient in a small way the whole system of mutual understanding may fall to the ground, and so imperil our interests is to deprive duty of its real meaning in our minds. The man who has a conscientious sense of duty is prepared to face the loss of everything and the destruction even of the world to obey his sense of allegiance to the ideal. Of ideals there can be but one supreme one, a supreme Being. From this ideal the reaction of the moral sense comes. Conformity to the moral ideal and to nature conduces most to their realization, when made in harmony. This necessitates the preservation of individuality as a first consideration, and this, I venture to say, is the true doctrine of *laissez-faire*. Not the blind

fatalism of a narrow interpretation of evolution whereby men cry *laissez aller*.

To deny *à priori* moral grounds, or to maintain that moral sanctions arise from utilitarian sanctions, is to found human relations, in the last analysis, upon force. Under such a condition we should expect a return to first principles as the completion of a cycle. The ideal man, under such conditions, is the strong man. But the movement of mankind is in accordance with an acknowledged tendency or striving to the ideal. "And Green," says Mr. Ritchie (Prin. of State-Int.), "argues that the self is other than a mere series of feelings just because it is what renders possible the consciousness of a series of feelings: the self-consciousness which is manifested in them must yet be other than they; for as J. S. Mill himself had seen it was a 'paradox' that what is only a series of feelings should be aware of itself as a series. In this fact of self-consciousness, discovered by examination of mental phenomena, Green finds the metaphysical basis of ethics; on the other side, the interpretation of self-realization, as the realization of a common good, is what makes the connection between ethics and politics. Thus, Mr. Ritchie continues, the practical tests which Green applies to determine the rightness of any proposed course of conduct, either for the individual or for the State, seem to coincide with those which would be proposed by the utilitarian." This limits self, it would seem, to self-consciousness. The same reasoning would confine all phenomena to our realization of them. Whereas we know that almost the first thing we apprehend is the dependence of self upon something beyond our realization. It is also to say that the objective is limited by the subjective as some contend and that the universe is limited by our ideas of it. This, however, is hardly satisfactory. It seems moreover impossible to suppose that our conscious suffering is merely a process of nature in the course of a system of physical evolution. That it is a process in the evolution of spiritual man, is, however, both supposable and apparent. The maintaining of the theory of utility in its entirety seems inevitably to deny a settled criterion of judgment. For the selection of the greatest happiness for the greatest number is impossible where the experiences and requirements of men are unlimited in extent and variety. "And he (Green)," says Mr. Ritchie, "considered the Hegelian attempt to read off the whole secret of the universe, to fill up the whole contents of the eternal self-consciousness premature and overhasty."

In leading up to the discussion of the social individual we shall begin with Woman.

With regard to Woman it may be said that, as the life of the species requires and supposes the contemporaneous existence of man and woman, it is proper to consider her as identical with man. There relations are by nature those of complete communion, each sacrificing and providing for the other. To deny woman her independent theoretical position as an independent individual member of society is a piece of unwarrantable assumption. She is morally equally responsible with man and physically even more so. It is only fit that while she realizes in herself the final consummation of nature her mate should assist her in procuring food. Is the procuring of food his concern only? If so the commercial and political relations of life are for him alone to determine. None the less does nature accord to the female the glory of the mightier achievements, nor, indeed, does nature deny to her the right to sustain herself by procuring food.

Social relations are of a different kind. As the persistence of the species depends upon the last man and woman left alive and capable, the needs of the species in general are for that reason subordinate to the needs of a single pair. The individuals of a pair must agree upon a satisfactory *modus vivendi* to permit of reproduction, but there is no natural obligation that pairs should agree with each other. Agreements between pairs are artificial and therefore it is better to take a pair as the primal component of society. It is true that it is usually considered that everything tends to the preservation of the type. "So careless of the single life" as Tennyson puts it. Yet it must be supposed that nature strove originally to preserve the first pair, and that, therefore, it would still be, if necessary, her first consideration. It would seem, indeed, if one may venture to say so, as if she were not careless but careful of the single life. The "type" is evidently the individual, not the race. But just as physical conditions soften the struggle leading