his family." In either case, the aid of the civil power might be needed to give effect to their decisions, if questions of property were involved.

I have never, in the exercise of discipline, affected to do more than to put in force a jurisdiction or authority over those who had voluntarily submitted themselves to that jurisdiction and authority. I have claimed the same right, but no greater, to administer the laws of this Church, whether in my capacity of Metropolitan, or in that of Bishop, than would be conceded to a Roman Catholic Bishop, or a Wesleyan Superintendent, in the administration of the laws of their respective communities, or than was conceded to the Church of the early ages by heathen Emperors, or is conceded to the Church in America in these days by the civil power. And this right has been acknowledged, as it could hardly fail to be, by the highest Court of Law in England. We are pronounced to be (Judgment of Privy Council, *Long v. Bishop of Cape Town*), "in the same situation with any other religious body; in no better, but in no worse position." They are allowed to exercise their laws in their own way, through their own officers; and it is conceded that we are entitled to do the same. The principles laid down by Lord Lyndhurst on this subject in the case of Dr. Warren, with regard to the Methodist community, are declared by the Judicial Committee of Privy Council, "to be founded in good sense and justice, and established by the highest authority," and to be the principles to which our Courts of Law will "strictly adhere." The language of that great Judge is as follows:

"The district committee *had a power to regulate their own proceedings. They had a power to do so; and whether it was duly exercised or not I wish to give no opinion.* Upon whether it was a discreet exercise of that power, I give no opinion; but they exercise that power that no stranger should be present. They have authority to do that; and that does not therefore render the proceedings illegal or invalid. *It is again said that the publication * * * * was in reality not an offence; not an offence entitling this body to exercise the jurisdiction; and that it did not support the charges that were preferred against him,* copies of which were handed to me. The evidence does not appear to have been gone into. I presume that was because he was absent and did not attend. *Whether it did support those charges or not was a question for the district meeting. I have no jurisdiction with respect to it. A particular tribunal is established by the agreement of those parties to decide a question of this kind. I therefore have no authority to say whether, within the meaning of the rules of this Society, this pamphlet was or was not an offence; that was peculiarly for the decision of the district committee.* I therefore am of opinion, not only that the district committee had the power to suspend, but I am of opinion that they acted legally. I am not called upon to say more. *Whether they acted wisely, discretely, temperately, or harshly, these are matters with which I have no concern,* and upon which I desire now to express no opinion. *Therefore, upon these grounds merely rests the regularity of the proceedings, and being satisfied of the authority of the body,* I am bound to affirm the decision in this respect of the Vice-Chancellor."

With our highest Court of Law, I believe that in these words are laid down true principles for the guidance of all Civil Courts with regard to all causes brought before them by members of religious bodies not established by law. They have only to inquire whether, according to the rules of a particular religious association, certain parties are entitled to sit in judgment upon certain causes. If they decide that they are, and there is no evidence of "mala fides," there the function of the Civil Court ends If it proceed further, and inquires into the merits of a particular cause, more especially in matters relating to the faith, it invades religious liberty. It constitutes itself a judge on matters of which it is not entitled to take cognizance and its assumption of such a right should, and wherever there is life in a Church would, be resisted. To these principles the Civil Courts of America strictly adhere, and there are, consequently, no collisions between religious bodies and civil authorities.

In England I may venture to observe that the establishment of the Church has so habituated the minds of the civil judges to entertain ecclesiastical questions, and of the people generally to acquiesce in such a state of things, that there is some danger lest the Courts, when matters involving temporal rights are brought before them by religious bodies in the colonies, should overlook the fact that the civil judges are not judges in ecclesiastical causes for non-established Churches,