

unfortunate judgments. One of the worst of these is the one delivered by the late Chief Justice Armour to the effect that a person does not practise "medicine" who does not give drugs. This is altogether too narrow a view to take. It had, however, the unfortunate effect of opening the door to an influx of all the varieties of drugless practitioners. But this judgment is now the law of the province and can only be counteracted by a statute setting forth in clear language what the practice of medicine really means.

We urge upon the members of the medical profession to give this matter their serious consideration. So much rests with them. They alone are in the best position to educate the members of the Legislature from their ridings. This is the main point. There are twelve hours in the day. See that they are properly used.

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#### AN IMPORTANT JUDGMENT.

A few weeks ago Mr. Justice Clute gave a judgment in the case of an action brought against a practitioner, which is of the utmost importance. The case was a unique one, especially in one particular.

The plaintiff was a woman on each of whose breasts an operation was performed. The lady consulted a doctor about a lump in one of her breasts. The doctor said he also detected a lump in the other breast, and secured the patient's consent for the removal of both lumps. This doctor referred the case to a surgeon of experience, who removed the lump in one of the breasts. While the patient was under the anæsthetic, the doctor who had been first consulted said that there was a lump in the other breast, and that the surgeon doing the operation should remove it also, as the patient had given her consent. The breast was prepared and the operation was performed.

Some time after the operation trouble arose in the arm of the second side operated on. An action was brought against the surgeon who performed the operation, alleging assault, on the ground of doing an operation on a part of the body where consent had not been given. In this respect the plaintiff was in conflict with the doctor first consulted.

After hearing a considerable amount of evidence on this branch of the case, Mr. Justice Clute held that a surgeon is justified in performing a second operation under circumstances where the case demands that more be done than was at first detected or revealed. It was held that a surgeon might even be open to blame if he did not perform such further operation, if it could be shown that such was necessary for the cure of the patient.