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The chief interest of the day centres on the fortunes of Evolution. There is nowhere a disposition to make light of its progress; the question is,—how can it deal with the grand problems of human life and destiny? It has much to do before it can claim to have surmounted its difficulties; what lies behind as fairly accomplished is comparatively easy in contrast with a theory of human knowledge and practice. It has not yet found. and does not seem near the discovery, a reliable theory of intelligence, much less of moral life. Its grand difficulties are to be met, now that it has escaped from the entanglements which suspicion and traditionalism occasion. The passage from laws of organism to laws of knowledge is not an easy one. The most competent scientific observers who have given concentrated attention to the subject have openly avowed their perplexity (Tyndall, for example), and have admitted that they cannot brldge the chasm which severs organism from consciousness. This is the most noticeable thing now under attention. The only course open to the Evolutionist is to make larger demands on organism. And in what perplexity is the scientist when he proceeds on these lines, unable to move a step save on authority of observed facts. We are in possession of a trustworthy physiology; we know something of the work which can be done by that marvellous structure we name brain; and we are aware that it keeps in its secrets a multitude of unanswered questions. But the puzzle for the Evolutionist is this, that while we know much as to what nerve and brain actually accomplish, and are fully warranted to reason from analogies, we also know what facts are included in thought and purpose and progressive intelligent life, and that these cannot be explained by brain action. Here the scientist has no science; he may have expectations, but in cherishing these he is trusting to a hidden magic of brain cells, which cannot well be credited as among scientific data. The Evolutionist has here his most difficult task. The eyes of observers necessarily turn on this part of the field, and it is required of all who would contribute to advance that they conform to the scientific requirements which they have themselves accepted.

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