

namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, *even where these objects are military objectives* [italics added], if such attack causes the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population”.

Like all treaties, Protocols I and II demand good faith from their parties if their objectives are to be achieved. Subject to certain reservations, primarily relating to the political character of many of its provisions, it is probable that Protocol I will receive a reasonable number of signatures and ratifications, even though the military commands of the participating countries might not be over-enthusiastic. So far as Protocol II is concerned, it is likely that the developed countries that have reservations concerning Protocol I will find it relatively easy to accept this instrument. For the most part, however, they are not the countries for which it is intended. True, there is no guarantee that any country today is immune from civil war and other forms of non-international armed conflict. The provisions of Protocol II tend, however, to reflect the basic humanitarian ideas that are familiar to

those brought up in the Judaeo-Christian traditions of Western democracy and, even should a conflict ensue, the parties may be expected to respect the basic humanitarian imperatives embodied therein. But with some of the new states, and even some of those to which civil war has traditionally almost been endemic, it may well be that there will be considerable hesitancy about acceptance. It would be somewhat ironic if this protocol, which is really intended to introduce humanitarian principles into an area hitherto completely free from international regulation, is ratified only by those that accept its principles (even if they are not written down) or that are least likely to be called upon to put them into operation. On the other hand, it is quite possible that, if a country were to find itself involved in such a conflict, it might well consider it to its own advantage to accept the obligations of Protocol II, either in the hope that the rebels would do the same or because the rebels had made propaganda gains on the international stage by announcing their intention of observing and applying its principles.

Letter to the Editor

Sir,

F. S. Manor's article "By abandoning peacekeeping NATO could be reinforced" (*International Perspectives*, July/August 1977) calls for comment. Mr. Manor describes the ideal UN as one "that would be able to preserve law and order as a policeman on the beat ensures by his mere presence that order is kept and law obeyed". Policemen might be surprised to know they have this effect, but it is certainly true the UN rarely comes close to it. Even policemen would be unable to cope if criminals were to command the support of whole neighbourhoods. The point is that the control of law and order is vested in states, not in the UN. Nor was it meant to be otherwise. The veto was written into the Charter at the insistence of *all* the great powers. Throughout his article, Mr. Manor confuses two quite separate concepts: peacekeeping and enforcement. In doing so, he sets impossibly high standards for peacekeeping and concludes inevitably that it is futile.

Enforcement, or collective security, was envisaged in Articles 42-46 of the UN Charter and presupposed the deterrence or punishment of aggressors by the combined military might of the international community. Once the Cold War broke out, the needed unanimity of the great powers was broken and no enforcement action was possible (except for the Korean operation in 1950, when the U.S.S.R. was boycotting the Security Council). Peacekeeping, on the other hand, relies on the voluntary co-operation of opposing parties to maintain the peace. A peacekeeping mission is usually designed to discourage disputes from degenerating into armed conflicts, to verify that armistice lines are observed, or to supervise a process of disengagement. It assumes a degree of self-restraint by the parties involved and should ideally be linked with other *peacemaking* activities (e.g., negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, etc.). If and when circumstances change to the point where these conditions are no longer met, a peacekeeping mission will not be able to fulfil its mandate (as occurred in Egypt in 1967 and in Cyprus in 1974). One does not usually blame policemen for the existence of crime.

Mr. Manor also makes a number of questionable statements. He writes: "In June 1964, Canada was instrumental in calling an international conference to discuss the set-