

were to become acute between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., the problems of recovery and development in the U.S.S.R. are so great that the possibility of warfare between these two Great Powers during the next decade is extremely remote.

5. Although on present prospects Canadian planning for the ten years after the war need not emphasize the possibility of attack on North America or of the outbreak of war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., there will be considerable military needs to be met by the United Nations during all or part of that period. In the first place, the aftermath of the war may leave in parts of Europe and Asia conditions of local disturbance requiring the presence of Allied forces to prevent relapse into anarchy. Secondly, considerable forces will be needed for the policing of Germany and Japan so that the terms of surrender may be enforced. Thirdly, during that decade the new system of world security should be in process of development, and Canada and other countries will be expected to maintain military establishments large enough to make a proportionate contribution to the forces available for employment in the interests of general security.

6. Before a more comprehensive report is prepared on post-war defence arrangements with the U.S., it would be of assistance to ascertain whether the argument of paragraphs 1-5 is generally acceptable and whether the following preliminary conclusions are concurred in by the Cabinet War Committee:

(a) Canada and the United States will continue after the war to consult and cooperate on defence matters along the lines developed since the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940. The P.J.B.D. will be maintained as part of the machinery for joint defence planning.

(b) Canada will not be willing to permit the United States to provide and maintain defence installations in Canadian territory. Canada will itself provide, maintain and operate all such installations, with the possible exception of facilities installed by international agreement in special cases.

(c) Requirements in men, material, airfields, coastal defences, naval bases, radar, etc. for the defence of Canada will be influenced by the assessment in Washington of threats to North American security. The possibility of renewed aggression by Germany or Japan will be one factor in this assessment. It is not improbable, however, that the means of meeting possible attack by the U.S.S.R. will be an important element in defence planning in the United States.

(d) Because of this Canada may be subjected to pressure to undertake defence commitments of considerable magnitude which might become a source of friction between Canada and the U.S.S.R., as constituting a threat to the security of the U.S.S.R. Canadian defence arrangements with the United States will, therefore, be greatly influenced by the general character of the relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. the maintenance of good relations between those two countries is a matter of great importance to the defence of Canada.

(e) It is therefore greatly in the national interest that Canadian defence arrangements with the United States should fall into place as part of a general system of world security.

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