NATO—European Defence Community

at a most comprehensive statement issued by the British Labour party, which after all in the recent elections last October polled the largest popular vote and may within a measurable period of time once more become the government of the United Kingdom. The British Labour party issued a statement on April 30 which does not reject, as we do not reject, the possibility of conditional German rearmament, but in confirming its agreement on this point it lays down certain conditions which I should like to place on the record. They are four in number and may be summarized as follows:

(a) No effective German rearmament so long as the Atlantic forces in Europe are not well organized and equipped.

(b) Western nations other than Germany—in particular France—to be given priority for deli-

veries of American arms.

(c) The integration of German troops in an international army.

(d) No German rearmament so long as the Germans themselves do not wish to rearm.

I think the latter is a very important proviso because if we are going to have successful integration and support of German troops under an international army of defence then the German people must support what is being done or it will fail. More than a year ago Mr. Clement Attlee, who it will be remembered was at that time prime minister of Great Britain, had already referred to the first three of these conditions, and I understand that the fourth was recently attached after a long discussion at the national executive meeting of the Labour party of Britain. I have a longer statement which I do not intend to read now because I may not have time but which underlines and elucidates the position taken, the four points that they made, and particularly their support for the demand of France for greater aid from the United States. The official statement of the social democratic party in Germany is also something of which I think we should take some cognizance. The party's policy was stated on the 27th of April by its vice-chairman, Erich Ollenhauer, and was reported as follows:

(a) Ollenhauer pleaded for priority to be given to the Soviet proposals for German reunion and a German peace treaty, and for all other questions to be postponed until a coherent effort had been made to reach four-power agreement on Germany.

(b) The first object of German foreign policy, he said, should be to test the sincerity of these Russian proposals.

As a matter of fact I think there is an obligation on all of us to test the sincerity of these proposals. In our hearts we may believe them to be insincere but we are engaged in a cold war, a war of words, a war of ideas, and we have to make it abundantly clear that we have tested the sincerity of all proposals emanating from the

[Mr. Coldwell.]

other side before we reject them if we are to obtain support for our cause throughout the world. It goes on:

This could be done by proving whether or not there were genuine possibilities of free all-German elections. Should such possibilities not exist, every German must be satisfied that every possible effort had been made by the western powers and the Federal German Republic.

(c) The signing of the contractual agreements, and the integration of West Germany in the defence system would at least make German reunion more difficult and might prevent it altogether. German participation in a European army could scarcely be interpreted as a friendly gesture by the Soviet union. The whole present conception of European integration was, moreover, basically false.

(d) Instead, the western powers should give the Soviet union a "timetable" for negotiations on German unity. This would prevent deliberate attempts to protract four-power talks and so sabotage western plans. Such questions as the Oder-Neisse line should not be brought up for a moment; they would only prejudice chances of arranging all-German elections. No alternative western policy should be applied to Germany until it was clear that such elections could not be held.

Apparently that is the official position of the official opposition party in Germany which, with the increased support it has received in the country over the last number of months, may within the next thirteen or fourteen months when the federal elections are due become the government of Germany in any event, and if elections are held sooner might become the government much earlier.

I think we should also pay some attention to the Scandinavian countries which are not a part of NATO, though in association with it. The international secretary of the Swedish social democratic party, Kaj Bjorh, in an article which he has written, has this to say:

(a) The question of German rearmament should be postponed if possible until the question of German unity is solved. Otherwise an extremely dangerous explosive situation will develop in the centre of Europe. This recommendation is in line with the German social democrats' present policy even though that policy has partly a different motivation.

I would comment here that the Swedish foreign minister, Osten Unden, made a proposal in the United Nations that the four big powers should take up negotiations on the question of free elections throughout Germany and report back to the United Nations within one month. This proposal was made last winter during the interval between the Rome and Lisbon meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One could continue to quote not only the social democrats but the other party which is associated with Adenauer. They are the free democrats who are in a coalition with the Christian democratic union party in Germany. Dr. Karl Pfleiderer of the free democrats has expressed his doubt as to the wisdom of implementing the treaties in a hurry. He actually assailed