

*The Address—Mr. Pearson*

many quarters, including many quarters in this house, to proceed very cautiously in this matter. Furthermore, a number of countries which had recognized the Chinese communists had had great difficulty in getting the Chinese communists to recognize them, at least to the point of entering into effective diplomatic relations with them. For example, the United Kingdom had recognized the regime in Peking but it was far from clear that that regime in any effective sense recognized the United Kingdom. Then came the attack on Korea in June. There was much evidence that that attack had been prepared with the approval, and indeed with the support, of the Chinese communists, and we did not feel justified in taking any action toward recognition until the circumstances surrounding the aggression in Korea had become clearer. I need hardly add that when late last year the Chinese government in Peking joined in the aggression in Korea, it was inconceivable that countries which had hitherto withheld recognition would at that time decide to change their policies.

I feel, however, that the Far Eastern problems could be more readily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the government of China, which has the whole of the mainland of China under its control. But the Peking government can hardly expect recognition now from those member states of the United Nations against whom they are fighting in Korea. The remedy for the situation now lies with the communists themselves. They should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the United Nations.

The next specific and controversial issue which arose at Lake Success on Far Eastern questions, and which I want to discuss, was whether or not General MacArthur should be authorized by the United Nations to extend military operations beyond the 38th parallel in Korea. The 38th parallel was not important from the military point of view, but it was obvious that its crossing would have political and symbolic significance, indeed as its recrossing would have even more significance. At this time I do not need to remind the house that it was never intended by the United Nations that Korea should be cut in two along the parallel. In resolutions of the general assembly of the United Nations the objective of a free, independent and united Korea had been clearly laid down. Nevertheless, in spite of those resolutions this line, which had originally been merely a line of military convenience, had become a Rubicon, the line which marked in that part of the world a division between the Soviet world and the free world.

The decision to authorize the United Nations forces to cross that line could not be taken lightly, and it was not taken lightly.

There were strong reasons at that time for giving such authorization. Although the North Korean forces had been badly defeated by General MacArthur's skilful campaign, large elements had escaped, and those remnants could not be made harmless unless the United Nations commander had the opportunity of pursuing them into North Korea. If they were not overpowered, the risk would remain that after they had regrouped and been re-equipped they might once again fall on Southern Korea after the United Nations had been withdrawn. Moreover, as I have stated already on a number of occasions, the United Nations itself had passed resolutions in favour of a united and independent nation in Korea.

The members of the Canadian delegation were impressed by these arguments, and by certain military information given to us, and we agreed, along with a great many other delegations, with the resolution proposed in the United Nations assembly authorizing the United Nations forces to take any action which was necessary to unify the whole of Korea. We, along with others, realized that risks would be involved, and efforts were made in the United Nations to reduce those risks to the minimum. For that purpose we proposed sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to the North Korean government to give up the fight before the line had been crossed, but we were not successful in establishing communications for that purpose.

After that line had once been crossed, the possibility of an early settlement depended on the campaign in North Korea itself. During the discussions which were had on the crossing of the parallel we had reason to believe that it was not the intention of the unified command to pursue the North Korean forces right up to the Manchurian border. We had reason to believe that a defensive line could be established across the narrow waist of North Korea, and that the two northern provinces of Korea would be left, for the time being at least, as a kind of unoccupied frontier area. That scheme seemed sensible to us, and we hoped it could be carried out.

With many other delegations, including indeed the delegation of the United States of America, we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized, on this and on other occasions, that the unified command was responsible for the operations