

ing that they were not so very successful by the policy of delay in securing terms with the United States, thought they would see what they could do with a policy of vexation. Well, they succeeded admirably; they succeeded in exasperating 60,000,000 of people, and in being forced to concede what under other circumstances would never have been demanded. Sir, the hon. gentleman told us that he had not met anybody at Washington who did not say that the Treaty of 1854 was mutually advantageous to both countries. He said that everyone he had met and conversed with on this subject entertained the same opinion as to the mutual advantages that were conferred by that treaty; and the treaty was repealed, not because it was not commercially satisfactory, but because of political irritation that existed between the two countries. Well, Sir, the hon. gentleman would have led the House to believe that the political irritation to which he referred was due to the depredations committed by the *Alabama*. Sir, that was not the case. The treaty was repealed in consequence of the action of the Tory party in this country. Why, Sir, we know how the defeat of Pope was ridiculed. The hon. gentleman who now leads the Government led the Government at the time of the civil war. We know that when Parliament met at Quebec the hon. gentleman and his colleagues rose and cheered and sang "Dixie" when it was reported that Hooker was defeated at Chancellorsville. No American came to Canada and met the hon. gentleman or any of his supporters, who did not feel that he was in a country that was controlled by those who were hostile to him. So the American people took the first opportunity of putting an end to a treaty that was commercially satisfactory to both countries, in consequence of the avowed sympathies of hon. gentlemen opposite for the south. Why, Sir, we know the sentiments that were expressed at that time. Those hon. gentlemen told us that democracy was a failure, that the people were not capable of governing themselves, that they required an aristocratical or monarchical element as ballast for the political ship in order that it might sail safely for any length of time; and so they rejoiced at what seemed the disruption of the American republic. Not because the people of that republic had done them any wrong, but because they were hostile to a free government, and were anxious that their predictions as to its failure should be, as they apparently were, confirmed. Now, Sir, we have had a second exhibition of hostility, which had its origin in the policy of retaliation, of which I believe the hon. gentleman claims to have been the author; at all events, so far as I know, he was the first to suggest it. Well, Sir, I am glad the hon. gentleman has made progress; I am rejoiced to see that he now entertains views of a different character. The hon. gentleman is now inclined to believe that freer intercourse with the neighboring republic would be of advantage to this country. But the hon. gentleman told us that the Treaty of Washington was a wise treaty—that everybody now praised it, although we on this side at the time were violently opposed to it. I would like anyone to mention a single clause of that treaty which is now approved of to which we were opposed at that time. There is not one. We were opposed to the free navigation of the St. Lawrence being granted to the Americans without our consent and without our receiving anything in return. There is no river in Europe that is made navigable to those high up the stream through to the sea, that is not also navigable to those at the mouth as far up as the river is used for navigation. The same is true of every river in South America; but that was not the rule secured to us by the Washington Treaty. The people of Chicago have a right to use the St. Lawrence for all time to come for going to the sea and returning to Chicago; but we are not free to navigate Lake Michigan or to go to Chicago. He knows that we did not secure the free navigation of the River Columbia

Mr. MILLS (Bothwell).

or the rivers of Alaska. He knows that we surrendered the use of our canals without getting anything in return. There is not a provision of the Treaty of 1871 of which we complained then that we do not complain of to-day. The hon. gentleman has told us that we do Mr. Chamberlain an injustice in holding him responsible for the concessions that were made. I believe, Sir, that is true. I believe Mr. Chamberlain was not more anxious to make concessions to the United States than was the hon. gentleman himself or the hon. gentleman who sits beside him. Mr. Chamberlain recently said, in addressing the people of Birmingham:

"The Canadian Government and its representatives were most desirous of terminating a state of irritation dangerous in its possible consequence to Canada."

Mr. Chamberlain says the hon. gentleman was anxious to terminate this state of irritation, but how came there to be a state of irritation? It is a mistake to suppose that in this case concessions were made simply at the demand of the Government of Great Britain. The hon. gentleman knows the state of exasperation in which he found the public sentiment in the United States; and knowing that it was dangerous to this country, knowing that the American Government could do us immensely more mischief than we could do them by a policy of non-intercourse, he was anxious to come to terms at any price; he was just as anxious to make concessions as Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Chamberlain visited this city; he saw the Prime Minister and no doubt learned the situation. He ascertained the views of the First Minister quite as well as the Minister of Finance, knowing that he and his colleagues were responsible for the condition of things that existed in the United States, I have no doubt was quite as anxious to make concessions as was the British representative who came from Birmingham. The hon. Minister of Finance devoted a great deal of time in praising the commissioners; but there is one thing which he did not explain to us, but which he will perhaps explain before the debate closes, that is, how Mr. Bayard came to name him as the British commissioner. The hon. gentleman knows that in Mr. Bayard's letters, Mr. Bayard expresses, not only his readiness to enter into negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom, with the view of coming to a better understanding, but also names the hon. gentleman as the British commissioner he was most anxious should carry on the negotiations. At whose suggestion was the hon. gentleman named? It would seem, from his statement, that the Imperial Government was rather inclined to name his colleague, Sir John A. Macdonald, but that hon. gentleman, with that modesty for which he is distinguished, gave up his right to the honor, and allowed it to be conferred, in accordance with Mr. Bayard's suggestion, upon his colleague the Minister of Finance. The hon. gentleman says that we owe a great deal to the right arm of Great Britain in this controversy. I do not think that the military power or the diplomatic resources of England were of the slightest use to us. On the contrary, I believe they have done us much mischief. I believe that the hon. gentlemen on the Treasury benches would scarcely have ventured to enter upon their policy so impudent, so offensive to the people of the United States, and so mischievous and disastrous in its consequences to the people of this country, if they had not supposed the Government of England would have helped them through the difficult crisis upon which they had entered. What has happened forces us to recognise the fact that the 60,000,000 of people to the south of us are supreme on this continent, that the Munroe doctrine, on the whole, is pretty well established on this continent, and that while the Government of the United Kingdom are ready to aid us by any amount of good advice, they will never be disposed to aid us with anything which can be of more effect. They recognise the fact that the Government of the United States is supreme, that whatever power or