

we know, moreover, that we would be attacked only in the event of war involving the United States and as a result of American policy differences with another nuclear power, the double logic of the situation dictates strict military non-alignment. In a very real sense the nuclear age has recreated for Canada a situation surprisingly similar to that in which our militia bills of the 1860's were debated. At that time everyone agreed that the only danger of attack lay in a breakdown of relations between Britain and the United States—and that the chief burden of defence would therefore be upon Britain. The main difference a hundred years later is that our protector could not protect us. I think it is a safe bet that, had Macdonald and Cartier disbelieved the power of Britain to defend us, Dominion status would have been achieved with more despatch than was in fact the case.

But the real point is, following from the above reflections, that we should revoke a policy of military alignment which is defended on the basis of a myth. In so doing we should not argue that withdrawal from the military alliances system results from our belief that the United States has to defend us willy-nilly; we should say plainly that there is *no* defence, there is only appalling danger that civilization will be annihilated if all states do not come to realize the facts. We should use our non-alignment quite consciously as an international image; not an image of aloof neutralism but an image of concern which reflects the real beliefs of the Canadian people rather than the tired, pre-nuclear age shibboleths of 'power'.

A modern policy of non-alignment might well draw sustenance from the non-military policy bases of our early Confederation years. In that period the governments not only knew that Canada could not afford to contribute anything of significance to the military defence of the empire, they also acted on the knowledge. The principal argument they advanced to London, in reply to *kreigsverein* suggestions was that our best contribution was the development of the country and the peaceful working out of the implications of our multi-national life. While it is true that on occasion someone like Sir Charles Tupper would argue that the building of the CPR was in fact a direct contribution to the military strength of the Empire, few Canadians took that argument seriously—and even fewer Englishmen. Only the rather suspicious Captain Mahan, prefiguring the patterns of American imperialism from the lessons of British sea power, thought that the CPR posed a threat to America. Our military non-alignment in such crises as that which enveloped General Gordon in the Soudan, left us free to develop the ways and sinews of peace. When, quite unnecessarily, we decided to align ourselves militarily with the Empire in 1899 in South Africa, we brought about one of the most serious of our racial crises. And it was a crisis which deepened steadily as our alignment and commitment deepened. Surely the lesson to be learned is that in periods when the military expenditures

which we can afford are insufficient to affect in any significant way the international 'balance of power' we are best advised to put all our effort into proving that a multi-racial state in the modern world can survive without atomizing itself and can develop a cultural life as rich, or richer, than that which can be afforded by nations which devote preposterous proportions of their national incomes to doomsday weapons.

Professor Fayrs has already demonstrated to this committee that a billion dollars could be pared from our defence budget without impairing our ability to provide the kind of para-military forces which we should, as a non-aligned state, have ready for UN police-supervisory actions. If these savings were spent on the alleviation of poverty and the enrichment of culture in Canada, and on extensions of our foreign aid programme it would take a courageous man to argue that they would not do more for the peace of the world, and for even a narrowly-conceived Canadian national interest, than the same billion dollars spent on weaponry and personnel which in no way affect the military power of the alliance.

But the argument for continuing our tight military alignment through NATO and NORAD and the defence production sharing agreement is far more complicated than the relatively superficial one of securing military defence. It is, however, no more convincing than the straight defence argument. That we buy influence at Washington is a part of the further argument for alignment that, again, Professor Fayrs has critically examined. In fact what we buy is inhibitions and defence contracts. An argument advanced less volubly, but of great influence amongst members of the Department of External Affairs, is that a strong NATO is the only sure means of keeping a chain on West Germany's territorial ambitions and any demand she might put forth to acquire her own nuclear weapons. And West German nervousness, it is argued, has justifiably increased because of Russia's intervention in Czechoslovakia. The argument is barely plausible, especially when it includes the proposition that the Soviet intervention renewed the military threat against western Europe. That intervention was a direct response to what Russia considered, rightly or wrongly, a threat emanating from NATO to detach Czechoslovakia from the Communist orbit. It was no different in kind from American intervention in Guatemala or the Dominican Republic or, abortively, in Cuba. That is, it was a reprehensible military action to preserve a sphere of influence. But it was an action of a sort that NATO was never designed to prevent; and it was an action which, in considerable degree, the existence of NATO made likely and possible. NATO, in short, is the principal justification for the Warsaw Pact. And without the Warsaw Pact cover the Russian action would have been diplomatically next to impossible.