

data would be collected by the inspectors. In my opinion, the possibility that the international inspectorate could be used in this way is exceedingly remote. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union would seriously contend that this risk compares in any way with the dangers which they themselves agree are inherent in continued testing.

It is also argued that the risk of a state evading its obligations under a nuclear tests agreement must be reduced to a minimum. My Delegation fully recognizes the importance of this requirement, since a treaty which would not give assurances that states were living up to their commitments would be cause for continuing concern and tension rather than diminishing these factors as an effective agreement is intended to do. But the risk of evasion should also be balanced against the dangers mankind must live with in the absence of an agreement. If it is feared that states might sign an agreement and later conduct secret tests, the nuclear powers must not only ask themselves whether this risk is acceptable in principle. They must also assess with equal care whether the military significance of such evasions would be greater or less than the dangers to health and security resulting from continued testing and an accelerated arms race.

This balance of risks and advantages has to be kept in mind in order that the negotiating parties may assess the real significance of possible espionage or evasions. As long as the negotiators concentrate their attention on the disadvantages to their security which might result from a particular system of inspection, it is doubtful whether any real progress is possible. But when these disadvantages are seen in their proper perspective, against the graver prospects of continued testing, the necessary conditions will exist to bring an effective test ban to reality. If the negotiating