

characterized by much greater levels of distrust and threat perception than anything ever seen in the Southern Cone of South America.

This paper seeks to show how the Argentines and Brazilians found it possible to pull back from the nuclear brink even though they could probably be classified as having been threshold states for some time when they chose to do so. What were the domestic and international factors that allowed this to happen? What obstacles had to be overcome in reaching that stage? Finally, and most important, are there lessons from this experience which can be helpful in the case of the India-Pakistan confrontation?

To do this, the paper will first give a brief description of the history and nature of the Argentina-Brazil rivalry, following this with its nuclear dimension. It will then address the question as to what were the features of the bilateral relationship, and the domestic situations in the two countries, which allowed for them to climb down from the confrontation to an extent where the nuclear option was no longer interesting for them.

It will then be time to discuss the India-Pakistan rivalry, again following it with the nuclear dimension added. The current state of play of the confrontation will then be discussed. Once completed, it will be possible to discuss the main differences between the two bilateral relationships, and address what specific differences arising from the nuclear question exist in the India-Pakistan context that did not in the Argentine-Brazilian. It will be important to assess what there is about the former case that makes it so much more thorny than the latter, as well as emphasise those elements of interest from the earlier case that might have resonance in South Asia.

Finally, something will be said about where there might be entry points for moving the India-Pakistan situation forward, especially those that might reflect South American experience. This discussion would end with the underscoring of those activities of the international community that might help to effect positive change.

It will be seen that through this historical approach to the subject, something in the nature of a typology for discussing the two contexts will emerge. In both cases, if to greatly varying degrees, one will see at play factors such as:

- the strategic context of each party, in particular the influence of internal and external threat perceptions on the development of nuclear policy;
- the strategic context of the region as a whole, to wit the impact of the larger strategic picture and the regional roles played (or not played) by major international actors;
- the influence of government and comparative stability of regimes. This is of particular interest given the instability of the two states in question, with Pakistan's due largely to the excesses of militarism, and India's, to the excesses of democracy;
- the relative influence of the armed forces of each state on the internal policymaking process;