

conventional forces in Europe be implemented in a controlled manner. This could be particularly important in the case of the two Germanies where their impending unification, and the virtual disappearance of the East German armed forces, have very important security implications for the USSR. In the circumstances, we believe the West should seek, to the greatest degree possible, to coordinate the reduction of both national and stationed forces in the two Germanies in phase with the process of German unification. Implementation of the reductions should be monitored by agreed verification procedures involving both NATO and Warsaw Pact officials. To this end, the West should not discourage the concept advanced by Gorbachev of preserving the political structure of the Warsaw Pact pending the creation of a new European security system.

The increasing public euphoria resulting from recent events in the East could give rise to pressures to abandon collective arms control negotiations and to allow disarmament to proceed on the basis of unilateral measures. We believe that Western governments should resist such pressures since only binding international agreements can establish reduced force levels as irreversible commitments. Moreover, the West should emphasize the importance of agreed provisions for effective inspection and verification, and the degree to which their full implementation by all parties to the agreements is essential for mutual confidence. Provisions for the destruction of major weapons rendered surplus by the reduction agreements seem not only to be essential to their success, but could also achieve positive results in limiting the flow of weapons to Third World countries.

The successful conclusion of the key agreements now under negotiation should be regarded as the beginning rather than as the end of the reduction process. Further progress will need to be made, even though there are several areas in which it is likely to be slow. Such areas will probably include: strategic nuclear weapons (after START I), the associated anti-ballistic missile issues, naval nuclear weapons, airborne interdiction stand-off weapons, nuclear weapons testing and nuclear weapons proliferation. In spite of reductions resulting from arms control negotiations, those states now possessing nuclear weapons will retain significant numbers of arms for strategic deterrence. Such weapons will